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ARTICLES 
IMPORTING ENERGY, 
EXPORTING REGULATION 
James W. Coleman* 
 
This Article identifies and addresses a growing contradiction at the heart 
of United States energy policy.  States are the traditional energy regulators 
and energy policy innovators—a role that has only grown more important 
without a settled federal climate policy.  Federal regulators and market 
pressures, however, increasingly demand integrated national and 
international energy markets.  Deregulation, the rise of renewable energy, 
the shale revolution, and new sources of motor fuel precursors like crude 
and ethanol have all increased interstate energy trade. 
This Article shows how integrated national energy markets are driving 
states to regulate imported fuel and electricity based on how it was 
produced elsewhere.  That is, states that import energy are now exporting 
their energy regulations to address production in their trading partners.  
But exported regulation has its own problems:  it threatens to splinter 
interstate markets, undercutting the federal push for integrated and efficient 
energy markets, and it violates the U.S. Constitution’s dormant Commerce 
Clause.  Indeed, these innovative exported regulations are now caught up in 
litigation across the country. 
This Article argues that, to preserve the state role, while also 
maintaining a national energy market, Congress should empower the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to immunize nondiscriminatory 
state laws from Commerce Clause scrutiny if, and only if, they do not 
threaten to splinter interstate energy markets.  The Article considers how 
these federal regulators might assess state energy laws in three salient 
areas:  regulation of (1) imported electricity, (2) imported fuel, and 
(3) energy export and supply chains. 
 
 
 
 
*  Assistant Professor, University of Calgary Faculty of Law, Haskayne School of Business.  
I am grateful for helpful feedback from Jonathan Adler, Deborah Behles, Seth Davis, Avlana 
Eisenberg, Jody Endres, Jacob Gersen, Sharon Jacobs, Alexandra Klass, Ryan Koopmans, 
William Magnuson, Michael Morley, Ricky Revesz, Matthew Stephenson, Seth Stoughton, 
Susannah Barton Tobin, Hannah Wiseman, and participants in workshops at the University 
of Calgary Faculty of Law and Harvard Law School. 
1358 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1358 
I.   IMPORTING ENERGY:  EXPANDING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
ELECTRICITY AND FUEL MARKETS .............................................. 1361 
II.   EXPORTING REGULATION:  REGULATING ENERGY PRODUCTION 
AND CONSUMPTION IN OTHER STATES AND COUNTRIES ............. 1367 
A.   Restrictions on Electricity Import .......................................... 1369 
B.   Restrictions on Fuel Imports.................................................. 1373 
C.   Restrictions on Fuel Exports ................................................. 1374 
D.   Restrictions on Cross-State Shipments of Energy Goods and 
Equipment ............................................................................. 1377 
III.   THE CASE FOR LIMITED FEDERAL AUTHORIZATION AND 
PREEMPTION OF STATE EXPORTED REGULATIONS ...................... 1378 
A.   Problem One:  Dormant Commerce Clause Litigation ......... 1379 
B.   Problem Two:  Splintering Energy Markets .......................... 1386 
C.   Solution:  Federal Supervision of Exported State Energy 
Regulation ............................................................................. 1388 
IV.   RECONCILING STATE REGULATION AND A NATIONAL MARKET .... 1395 
A.   Imported Electricity ............................................................... 1395 
B.   Imported Fuel ........................................................................ 1397 
C.   Exported Fuel and Energy Supply Chains ............................ 1398 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1399 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a critical moment for energy policy in the United States.  Over the 
past five years, increased production of both fossil fuels and renewable 
power, along with increasingly integrated markets in fuels and electricity, 
have transformed national energy markets and created skyrocketing demand 
for transport and transmission infrastructure.1  In the coming months and 
years, regulators and companies will make decisions that will have a 
profound effect on the nation’s energy system for a generation, which is 
also the critical window for addressing climate change.2  The divided 
federal government has not been able to settle on a response to this 
challenge which has made the states’ traditional role as laboratories of 
democracy for energy policy increasingly important.3 
States have responded by adopting renewable power standards, cap-and-
trade systems, coal-power phase-outs, and low-carbon fuel standards.4  
 
 1. See infra Part I. 
 2. Kelly Levin, World’s Carbon Budget to Be Spent in Three Decades, WORLD RES. 
INST. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.wri.org/blog/2013/09/world’s-carbon-budget-be-spent-
three-decades. 
 3. Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate 
Change Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 379, 401 (2009). 
 4. See James Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 
103 (2014) (state cap-and-trade); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate 
Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy:  A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. 
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These climate regulations all respond to increasingly national energy 
markets by scrutinizing fuel and electricity imported from other states and 
countries and requiring that these energy products be produced by low-
carbon methods even when production occurs elsewhere.5  That is, states 
are exporting their regulations to cover production of energy commodities 
in other states and countries that are part of global energy supply chains. 
Climate change gives states a compelling motive to regulate energy 
production outside of their borders because greenhouse gases emitted 
during production have the same impact on the climate whether or not they 
are emitted within the regulating state.6  If states were only to address in-
state energy production, emissions may shift to nonregulating jurisdictions 
entirely and thus negate the intended climate benefit of the importing state’s 
regulation.7  Although all environmental and labor regulations could push 
industries to other states or countries, climate change regulation is unique 
because there is no benefit to regulating if emissions merely shift 
elsewhere.  A state that loses jobs because it imposes a strict water quality 
law or on-the-job safety standard at least gains cleaner water or safer 
workers.  A state that loses industry due to climate regulation may be left 
with nothing.  When the industry moves to another state, its greenhouse gas 
emissions will still have the same effect on the shared climate.  Therefore, 
the fundamental challenge of climate regulation is how to ensure that 
increased regulation does not merely shift greenhouse gas emitting 
industries to nonregulating jurisdictions:  climate policy and 
competitiveness policy are necessarily intertwined.  Thus, state 
experimentation with exported regulations is a crucial laboratory for 
regulators around the world, demonstrating the promise and perils of 
leveraging subglobal regulation to address an entirely global dilemma. 
These exported energy regulations,8 however, present two serious 
problems.  First, under the U.S. Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause, 
 
REV. 1801, 1809 (2012) (renewable power standards); see also California Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2012) (low-carbon fuel standard); Minnesota 
Next Generation Energy Act, MINN. STAT. § 216H.03 (2011), invalidated by North Dakota v. 
Heydinger, No. 11-CV-3232 SRN/SER, 2014 WL 1612331 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2014) (coal 
phaseout).  For more detail, see infra notes 66–81 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE:  AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY 
QUESTIONS 10–11 (2001). 
 7. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 106–07 (describing how this phenomenon, known as 
“leakage,” undercuts incentives to regulate in other countries); see also Robert N. Stavins, 
Policy Instruments for Climate Change:  How Can National Governments Address a Global 
Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 317–19 (describing modes of leakage). 
 8. Exported regulations must not be confused with traditional environmental 
regulations that apply to in-state emissions but indirectly motivate action through the 
“California effect” in which out-of-state manufacturers upgrade their entire production line 
to the more efficient models demanded by one state’s regulation. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING 
UP:  CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 248 (1995) 
(using the term “California effect” to describe how California’s regulatory innovation has 
spread to other states through national trade).  The paradigmatic example of this effect is 
California automobile efficiency standards that drove manufacturers across the country and 
the world to manufacture more efficient vehicles. Id.; see also Anu Bradford, The Brussels 
Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2013) (describing spread of EU measures on hazardous 
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states may not tax or restrict imports based on how they were created in 
other states,9 even if failing to do so will undercut state regulation.10  So 
exported regulations are unconstitutional under a conventional dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis.  As a result, many of these regulations are 
currently embroiled in lawsuits around the country.11  Second, these 
regulations threaten to break up emerging national and international energy 
markets, undoing federal policies designed to integrate domestic energy 
markets.12  Splintered markets would forgo the efficiency benefits promised 
by integrated markets, squandering the opportunity to provide consumers 
with lower, less volatile energy prices.13 
This Article argues that these problems can be mitigated—and exported 
state energy regulation can be reconciled with emerging interstate energy 
markets—if Congress authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) to supervise state laws that regulate interstate energy 
transactions.  The dormant Commerce Clause is merely an inference from 
congressional silence, so federal regulators may immunize state regulations 
from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.14  Finally, federal energy 
regulators have expertise that would help them judge whether state energy 
regulation would endanger integrated energy markets.15  Thus, FERC is 
well positioned to authorize or preempt state regulation of out-of-state 
energy production. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes the increasing 
integration of markets for electricity, fossil fuels, and motor fuels.  Part II 
 
waste); Richard B. Stewart et al., Building Blocks for Global Climate Protection, 32 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 341, 378–80 (2013) (giving these effects the name “dominant actor strategies”).  
But those regulations applied to the characteristics of the product sold within California, not 
the process by which it was made.  By contrast, exported energy regulations do not apply to 
any characteristic of gasoline or electricity—those commodities are identical no matter how 
they are produced; instead the regulations prescribe how electricity and gasoline may be 
produced. See infra notes 83, 98 and accompanying text. 
 9. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994) (“States and 
localities may not attach restrictions to . . . imports in order to control commerce in other 
States.”); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (stating that regulation is forbidden 
by the dormant Commerce Clause if “the practical effect of the regulation is to control 
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State”). 
 10. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935); see also C & A Carbone, 
511 U.S. at 393 (finding that states may not “extend [their] police power beyond its 
jurisdictional bounds”).  See generally Douglas Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a 
Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621 (2008); Joseph Allan MacDougald, Why Climate Law 
Must Be Federal:  The Clash Between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State 
Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1431 (2008). 
 11. See infra Part III.A. 
 12. See infra Part III.B. 
 13. See Andrew R. Butters & Daniel F. Spulber, The Evolution of the Market for 
Wholesale Power 4, 9 (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law Searle Ctr., Working Paper) (using 
volatility as a proxy for grid isolation and explaining that “competition among retail 
electricity suppliers helped to reduce markups over the cost of purchased electric power by 
improving marketing efficiencies and lowering margins”), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter/events/energy/documents/ 
Butters_Spulber_energy.pdf. 
 14. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992). 
 15. See infra Part III.C. 
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explores the state response:  exported regulation that takes on energy 
extraction and production in other states and countries.  Part III makes the 
case for modifying the existing dormant Commerce Clause regime that 
controls exported regulation and argues that agency review is a more 
comprehensive and workable solution to the problem of exported state 
regulation.  Part IV concludes by briefly exploring how federal regulators 
could address three important categories of exported energy regulation:  
state regulation of imported electricity, state regulation of imported fuel, 
and state regulation of energy export and supply chains. 
I.   IMPORTING ENERGY:  EXPANDING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
ELECTRICITY AND FUEL MARKETS 
From the Roman Empire’s coal trade to ships circling the globe in search 
of whale oil, there has always been a global trade in energy.  But for many 
years, most energy was produced, distributed, and consumed on a relatively 
local scale.16  Electricity was produced and distributed by vertically 
integrated monopolies that were usually limited to a single state, or even a 
single metro area.  A single utility operated the power plants that produced 
electricity, the transmission lines that relayed that electricity to population 
centers, and the distribution lines that brought it to individual consumers.17  
Electricity sources were often local as well:  coal power was predominantly 
near coal-producing regions like Appalachia and Illinois,18 population 
centers near mountains were often served by hydroelectricity,19 and oil and 
natural gas power was more common in areas where those resources were 
plentiful.20  Power sources for heating were often local as well.21  Even 
 
 16. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 4, at 1805. 
 17. Id. at 1806 (“Until recently, most of the industry remained vertically integrated:  
most utilities owned large, centralized generation facilities, transmission lines, and 
distribution lines and covered an exclusive service territory, delivering electricity to 
customers for sales.”). 
 18. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FUEL COMPETITION IN POWER GENERATION AND 
ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION (2012), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/fuelelasticities/ 
pdf/eia-fuelelasticities.pdf (showing that coal makes up the bulk of fuel purchases in the two 
regions nearest the Appalachia and the Illinois Coal Basin, which are controlled by the 
Midwest Reliability Organization and the ReliabilityFirst Corporation); Electrical Power, 
HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE (June 10, 2010), http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/ 
online/articles/dpe01 (providing a historical overview of electrical power in Texas).  These 
patterns persist but are being altered by increased transportation and new fuel sources. See 
infra notes 36–49 and accompanying text. 
 19. DOUGLAS HALL, IDAHO NAT’L LAB., A STUDY OF UNITED STATES HYDROELECTRIC 
PLANT OWNERSHIP 6 (June 2006), http://www1.eere.energy.gov/water/pdfs/doewater-
11519.pdf (showing greatest hydroelectric capacity in California, Oregon, and Washington). 
 20. See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2005 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REPORT OF 
CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRICAL GENERATION SYSTEM 25 (2005), http://www.energy.ca.gov 
/2005publications/CEC-700-2005-016/CEC-700-2005-016.PDF (“Oil-fired power plant 
development began in the late 1930s and peaked in the 1950s.”); U.S. Energy Info. Admin., 
Alaska State Profile and Energy Estimates, http://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid=AK 
(last updated June 19, 2014) (Alaska, as a natural gas and oil producer, relies primarily on 
electricity generated by natural gas and diesel); U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Texas State 
Profile and Energy Estimates, http://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid=TX (Dec. 18, 
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crude oil, perhaps the archetypal global commodity, was often produced in 
state.22 
Over the past decades each of these energy markets has been radically 
transformed by new production and transport technologies, resulting in 
geographically expanded markets that crisscross jurisdictional boundaries.  
The transition has been perhaps most dramatic in electricity markets, where 
deregulation and the rise of renewable energy sources far from population 
centers have created an increasingly prevalent national electricity market.23  
In 1978, Congress and the states began restructuring these markets by 
encouraging or requiring vertically integrated utilities to purchase power 
from certain non-utilities that operated hydroelectric facilities or could 
produce electricity as a byproduct of other industrial activities—so-called 
“co-generation” facilities.24  In the 1990s, FERC began a more dramatic 
overhaul of the monopoly model, requiring utilities to “wheel”—i.e., 
transmit—power for all electricity producers.25  Transmission and 
distribution remained monopolies because of the difficulty of setting up 
parallel competing electric grids, but FERC believed that if these 
transmission monopolies charged independent power producers fair rates to 
deliver power to consumers, then all independent generators could compete 
with established utilities in an open market for electricity generation.26 
 
2013) (Texas, the nation’s largest natural gas producer, relies mostly on electricity from 
natural gas). 
 21. JOHN BARTECK, JR., NATURAL RESOURCE, AGRIC. & ENG’G SERV., HEATING WITH 
WOOD AND COAL 1 (2003) (describing transitions from local wood as a heating source to 
coal delivered by rail and then, at the middle of the twentieth century, to oil and gas using 
new distribution systems). 
 22. For example, as recently as 1994, more than half of the crude oil refined for use in 
California came from California. MARGARET SHERIDAN, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CALIFORNIA 
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS 1–2 (2006), http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
2006publications/CEC-600-2006-006/CEC-600-2006-006.PDF.  By 2005, California’s share 
of California crude had dropped to 37 percent. Id. 
 23. See Butters & Spulber, supra note 13, at 2  (using electricity pricing data to 
“conclude that a national market for wholesale electric power is emerging”); see also 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 468–69 (2005) (describing progress to date in integrating 
regional energy markets); David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 772–76 (2008) (describing development of competitive regional 
markets in both electricity and natural gas). 
 24. Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117; 
Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in 
Regulating the U.S. Electricity Market, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1347–48, 1354–89 (1993) 
(describing state regulation in California and the Northeast that required utilities to purchase 
power from these non-utilities at above-market rates).  Cogeneration facilities can produce 
power relatively cheaply as a byproduct of other industrial processes. U.S. Energy Info. 
Admin., Today in Energy:  Combined Heat and Power Technology Fills an Important 
Energy Niche (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8250. 
 25. Pierce, supra note 23, at 468–79 (describing progress of restructuring, which is 
assessed as “Near Complete Success in the Mid-Atlantic Region,” “Partial Success in New 
England, New York, and Texas,” and “Failure in California” and “The Rest of the 
Country”). 
 26. Id. at 464–66. 
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FERC’s restructuring plans met with only mixed success and many areas 
of the country remain dependent on traditional vertically integrated utilities 
for electricity.  Nevertheless, there has been a gradual trend toward 
competitive generation markets, which has resulted in more geographically 
integrated power networks.27  First, some regions have developed 
integrated, competitive power generation markets, such as the mid-Atlantic 
region, the Northeast corridor, and the Midwest.28  Second, as a result of 
federal and state policies there has been a large increase in the use of wind 
power,29 which often requires interstate transmission because suitable high-
wind sites are often located far from principal areas of electricity demand 
such as cities and manufacturing centers.30  Third, FERC has put pressure 
on all states—whether restructured or traditionally regulated—to develop 
regionally integrated transmission plans through Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs).31  As a 
result, most of the country—excluding the Southeast and the Mountain 
West—is now incorporated into one of seven RTOs and ISOs.32  
Additionally, FERC is working to expand nationally integrated transmission 
by pushing neighboring RTOs and ISOs to cooperate,33 and demanding that 
states consider the electricity needs of neighboring states when they 
respond to transmissions proposals.34  The net result of these efforts is an 
emerging integrated national electricity market.35 
 
 27. See Shmuel Oren et al., Alternative Business Models for Transmission Investment 
and Operation, in DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY C-9 
(2002) (describing FERC policy that “widespread interconnection and direct access to the 
transmission network will expand the scope of the market and foster market efficiency”). 
 28. The same is true, to a limited extent, of California. Pierce, supra note 23, at 471–77. 
 29. In 2012 more wind power capacity was installed than any other power type, 
including booming fossil fuel sources such as natural gas. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy 
Department Reports:  U.S. Wind Energy Production and Manufacturing Reaches Record 
Highs, ENERGY.GOV (Aug. 6, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://energy.gov/articles/energy-dept-
reports-us-wind-energy-production-and-manufacturing-reaches-record-highs (“In 2012, wind 
energy became the number one source of new U.S. electricity generation capacity for the 
first time—representing 43 percent of all new electric additions.”). 
 30. Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Wind Resources and Transmission Lines, NREL.GOV, 
http://www.nrel.gov/electricity/transmission/images/home_usmap.jpg (last visited Nov. 26, 
2014).  The greatest average wind speeds are concentrated in the less-populated plains states. 
See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, United States:  Land-Based and Offshore Annual Average Wind 
Speed at 100 m, ENERGY.GOV, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/images/ 
wind_speed_map_lg.jpg (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 31. Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. 
REV. 773, 804 & n.128 (2013); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Why FERC Must Mandate 
Efficiently Structured Regional ISOs—Now!, 12 ELEC. J. 49 (1999). 
 32. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Today in Energy:  About 60 percent of the U.S. Electric 
Power Supply Is Managed By RTOs, EIA.GOV (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.eia.gov 
/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=790. 
 33. FERC, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and 
Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,846 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 
C.F.R. 35). 
 34. Id. at 49,871. 
 35. Denise L. Desautels, Who Should Regulate the Siting of Electric Transmission Lines 
Anyway? A Jurisdictional Study, 18 ELEC. J. 11, 12 (2005) (“The restructuring of the electric 
industry and subsequent break-up of vertically integrated monopolies created regional and 
even national wholesale power markets.”); see also Spence, supra note 23, 772–75 
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Fossil fuel markets also have been shaken up by new transport and 
production techniques that have combined to displace traditional regional 
fuels, and enable export of fuels to distant markets.  Wellhead natural gas 
prices in the United States rose dramatically from 2002 to 2008, peaking at 
$10.79 per thousand cubic feet in July 2008.36  Since then, widespread use 
of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing of shale gas formations, 
commonly referred to as “fracking,” has unlocked vast new reserves of 
natural gas across the continent, pushing wellhead natural gas prices as low 
as $1.89 per thousand cubic feet in May 2012.37  This shale gas revolution 
has also dramatically expanded the nation’s proven natural gas reserves, 
suggesting that natural gas will be plentiful for many years to come.38  As a 
result, natural gas power plants have become viable in areas of the country 
that previously primarily relied on coal or other power sources.39 
This dramatic swing in natural gas prices has led to significant regional 
and global price disparities, which has motivated an increasing national and 
international trade in natural gas by land and sea.40  During the decade of 
peaking natural gas prices, the United States added over 20,000 miles of 
natural gas pipelines to connect expanding sources of natural gas 
 
(describing development of competitive regional markets in both electricity and natural gas).  
Indeed, energy markets are increasingly international. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 
31, at 780 n.22, 802–803, 811 (2013) (noting that the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation “writes and implements standards intended to guarantee the provision of a 
constant and adequate supply of electricity in the United States and several Canadian 
provinces”). 
 36. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price, EIA.GOV, 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Proven natural gas reserves nearly doubled from 1999 to 2011. U.S. Energy Info. 
Admin., U.S. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proved Reserves, EIA.GOV, 
www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).  Although there has 
been serious debate on how long these reserves, standing alone, will last, they certainly 
increase the likelihood of natural gas abundance for the coming decades. Chris Nelder, What 
the Frack?:  Is There Really 100 Years’ Worth of Natural Gas Beneath the United States?, 
SLATE (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/future_tense/2011 
/12/is_there_really_100_years_worth_of_natural_gas_beneath_the_united_states_.html. 
 39. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas Fracking Addresses All of Our Major Problems, 
4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 22, 23 (2013); COMPETITION IN POWER GENERATION 
AND ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION, supra note 18, at 4 (“The trend of natural gas displacing 
coal was especially evident in the southeastern United States between 2008 and 2009.”); 
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Today in Energy:  Ohio’s Fuel Mix for Power Generation Is 
Changing, EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5030 (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2014) (showing increasing use of natural gas in Ohio’s electricity mix); Ken 
Silverstein, Coal-Dependent States Get Second Chance with Shale Gas Boom, FORBES (Nov. 
14, 2013, 7:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2013/11/14/coal-dependent-
states-get-second-chance-with-shale-gas-boom (describing transition in West Virginia); 
Trevor Houser et al., State Contributions to Recent US Emissions Trends, RHODIUM GRP. 
(Oct. 28, 2013), http://rhg.com/notes/state-by-state-contributions-to-recent-us-emissions-
trends (showing gas displacing coal in Texas, Ohio, Georgia, Indiana, and Alabama). 
 40. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EFFECT OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ON 
DOMESTIC ENERGY MARKETS 3 (2012), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe 
/pdf/fe_lng.pdf; James Coleman, The Shale ‘Revolution’ Is About Gas Prices and Oil 
Production, ENERGY COLLECTIVE (July 17, 2014), http://theenergycollective.com 
/energylawprof/432466/shale-revolution-about-gas-prices-oil-production. 
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production with natural gas demand.41  Although there is less data available 
for recent years, it seems that this building boom has continued:  in 2011, 
2400 miles of pipeline were added, much of it in regions with significant 
fracking activity, such as Texas and the Northeast.42  There is every 
likelihood that the pace of pipeline building will continue:  in 2013 and 
2014, increasing reliance on natural gas for both electricity and heating 
created pipeline bottlenecks and price spikes across the country.43 
A booming international trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) has also 
emerged.  If it cannot be moved by pipeline, natural gas generally must be 
liquefied (and therefore condensed) by cooling before it can be transported 
overseas.  This is an expensive process, but improved technology and 
natural gas price disparities have enabled a booming trade in LNG—since 
1981, the global LNG trade has doubled every eight years.44 
In the decade of high gas prices, U.S. importers sought to build several 
new LNG import facilities.45  Now with shale gas driving U.S. prices below 
$3 per million British thermal units, and Asian shale gas prices over $15,46 
investors have submitted several applications to the Department of Energy 
for new LNG export facilities that could ship to Asia.47  The Department of 
 
 41. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MAJOR CHANGES IN NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION 
CAPACITY 1998–2008 2 (2008), available at http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/fwd 
/ngpipelinetc.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (“More than 20,000 miles of new natural gas 
transmission pipeline, representing more than 97 billion cubic feet per day of capacity, were 
placed in service in the United States over the past 10 years. . . .  Much of that growth was 
driven by the need to:  access new supply sources such as:  imports from Canada[;] 
expanding production from new natural gas fields.”).  Like natural gas prices, the pipeline 
boom spiked in 2008 with 3893 miles of new pipeline in that year alone. U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., EXPANSION OF THE U.S. NATURAL GAS PIPELINE NETWORK:  ADDITIONS IN 2008 AND 
PROJECTS THROUGH 2011 (2009), http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature 
_articles/2009/pipelinenetwork/pipelinenetwork.pdf. 
 42. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas Year-in-Review (With Data for 2011), 
EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/review/archive/2011 (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 43. See Clifford Krauss, Natural Gas Prices Soar As Mercury Plummets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 25, 2014, at B3; see also U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Today in Energy:  December 
Natural Gas Prices Spike in Boston, EIA.GOV (Dec. 6, 2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=14071. 
 44. Knut Einar Rosendahl & Eirik Lund Sagen, The Global Natural Gas Market:  Will 
Transport Cost Reductions Lead to Lower Prices?, 30 ENERGY J. 17, 17 (2009) (noting that 
“[o]ver the last decade the costs of LNG have been significantly reduced, more producers 
have entered the gas market in general and the LNG market in particular, and the trade 
between continents has increased”); INT’L GAS UNION, WORLD LNG REPORT 2011, at 7 fig.1 
(2011), http://www.igu.org/sites/default/files/node-page-field_file/LNG%20Report% 
202011.pdf. 
 45. Clifford Krauss, Exports of American Natural Gas May Fall Short of High Hopes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013, at B1. 
 46. ERNST & YOUNG, GLOBAL LNG, WILL NEW DEMAND AND NEW SUPPLY MEAN NEW 
PRICING? 13 fig.4 (2013), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global 
_LNG_New_pricing_ahead/$FILE/Global_LNG_New_pricing_ahead_DW0240.pdf. 
 47. EFFECT OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ON DOMESTIC ENERGY MARKETS, 
supra note 40, at 3 (“Unlike the oil market, current natural gas markets are not integrated 
globally.  In today’s markets, natural gas prices span a range from $0.75 per million British 
thermal units (MMBtu) in Saudi Arabia to $4 per MMBtu in the United States and $16 per 
MMBtu in Asian markets that rely on LNG imports.  Prices in European markets, which 
reflect a mix of spot prices and contract prices with some indexation to oil, fall between U.S 
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Energy has approved seven of these projects and is reviewing twenty-four 
more.48  Until global prices converge, global LNG transport will continue to 
increase.49 
The abundance of cheap natural gas has also resulted in surplus coal that 
now is being exported across the country, and to new markets abroad.50  In 
the second quarter of 2009, the United States exported only 13 million short 
tons of coal; in the second quarter of 2013, it exported 29.5 million short 
tons.51 
The increased international trade in fossil fuels for power production has 
been matched by an increasingly diverse interstate trade in unconventional 
sources of motor fuel precursors such as oil sands, non-corn ethanol,52 and 
oil from shale formations.53  For many years, most of the oil in the United 
States came from conventional oil production in the United States, Canada, 
or the Middle East.54  In recent years, several new sources of motor fuel 
have come to the fore.  In 2003, Canada’s vast oil sands resources—which 
consist of oil mixed with sand and clay—were declared “economically 
recoverable,” due to improved extraction techniques and high oil prices,55 
and since then U.S. imports of Canadian crude have gradually increased 
from 2072 barrels per day in 2003 to 3142 barrels per day in 2013.56  
Furthermore, in the last five years, unconventional fracking techniques have 
unlocked large volumes of domestic oil from shale in the Bakken formation 
 
and Asian prices. Spot market prices at the U.K. National Balancing Point averaged $9.21 
per MMBtu during November 2011.”). 
 48. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SUMMARY OF LNG EXPORT APPLICATIONS, 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/Summary_of_Export_Applications.pdf. 
 49. Global demand for North American natural gas seems likely to increase as air 
quality concerns limit coal-fired power and regulators demand power that, like natural gas, 
can easily ramp up and down to complement intermittent power sources like wind and solar. 
JOEL DARMSTADTER, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER US COAL AND 
NATURAL GAS EXPORTS 2–3 (2013), http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-IB-13-01.pdf 
(explaining how low North American natural gas prices have led to exports to Asia, where 
coal is still competitive with gas). 
 50. Id. 
 51. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., QUARTERLY COAL REPORT tbl.4 (2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/coal/production/quarterly/pdf/t4p01p1.pdf (providing monthly data on 
U.S. coal exports and imports from 2008 to 2014). 
 52. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 
2035, at 24 (2012) [hereinafter ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012] (“Bitumen production in 
Canada and biofuels production mostly from the United States and Brazil are the most 
important components of the world’s incremental supply of other liquids from 2010 to 2035 
in the Reference case.”). 
 53. This oil is known as “tight oil” and its production in the Bakken formation of North 
Dakota has transformed domestic crude markets. Id. at 2 (“Key results highlighted in 
AEO2012 include continued modest growth in demand for energy over the next 25 years and 
increased domestic crude oil and natural gas production, largely driven by rising production 
from tight oil and shale resources.”). 
 54. NEELESH NERURKAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41765, U.S. OIL IMPORTS:  
CONTEXT AND CONSIDERATIONS 4–5 (2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41765.pdf. 
 55. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CANADA REPORT 3 (2014), http://www.eia.gov/ 
countries/analysisbriefs/Canada/canada.pdf. 
 56. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Imports from Canada of Crude Oil and Petroleum 
Products, EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s 
=MTTIMUSCA2&f=A (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
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in North Dakota and the Barnett and Eagle Ford formations in Texas.57  
Finally, in the 2007 Renewable Fuel Standard, Congress mandated a 
massive expansion in biofuel consumption—asking the EPA to write 
regulations that force refiners to sell increasing volumes of biofuels, 
eventually reaching 36 billion gallons a year in 2022.58  Although the law 
mandates consumption of large volumes of conventional ethanol, it also 
requires use of a variety of other advanced biofuels, which in practice 
requires growing imports of sugarcane ethanol from Brazil.59 
Thus, energy has gone from a model where fuel was purchased from a 
limited number of sources and then electricity was consumed and produced 
locally, to a model where both fuel and electricity are shipped in rapidly 
evolving national and international markets. 
II.   EXPORTING REGULATION:  REGULATING ENERGY PRODUCTION 
AND CONSUMPTION IN OTHER STATES AND COUNTRIES 
Although there are important federal energy regulations, the fifty states 
remain the focus of energy regulation and the most important energy policy 
innovators.  The states implement federal pollution control standards that 
govern areas such as fossil fuel extraction, refining, and power 
production.60  They supplement these standards with their own policies that 
also affect each stage of energy extraction and production.61  They regulate 
electricity prices and reliability and often prescribe the appropriate mix of 
 
 57. ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 52, at 43 (“The increased variety and 
regional availability of certain crude types has created new market dynamics and pricing 
relationships that are difficult to capture using existing methods, especially considering the 
rapid emergence of ‘tight oil’ production, which, to date, has been substantially different in 
quality from the crude oil previously expected to be available to U.S. refineries.  For 
example, light sweet crude oil sourced from the Bakken shale formation in North Dakota has 
been sold to refiners on the Gulf Coast in recent years at a substantial discount relative to 
heavier imported crudes, because of limitations in the delivery infrastructure.”). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(B)(i)(1) (2012); ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra 
note 52, at 24 (“Bitumen production in Canada and biofuels production mostly from the 
United States and Brazil are the most important components of the world’s incremental 
supply of other liquids from 2010 to 2035 in the Reference case.”). 
 59. BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22870, WAIVER AUTHORITY 
UNDER THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD (RFS) 4 & 6 n.29 (2014), 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RS22870.pdf; RANDY SCHNEPF 
& BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40155, RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD 
(RFS):  OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 4 & n.10, 7, 23–26 (2013), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40155.pdf. 
 60. See Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 188–89 (2005). 
 61. For example, states have taken the lead in regulating extraction processes like 
natural gas fracking. See JACQUELYN PLESS, NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT AND HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING:  A POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE 1–4 (2012), www.ncsl.org/documents/energy 
/frackingguide_060512.pdf (noting that “[a]lthough a number of federal regulations govern 
the hydraulic fracturing process, states have regulatory primacy on this issue,” and that “[a]t 
least 119 bills in 19 states have been introduced this session that address hydraulic 
fracturing”). 
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power sources.62  They control siting of infrastructure for electricity 
transmission and transportation of liquid and solid fuels.63 
The states’ role as “laboratories of democracy” for energy policy64 has 
grown increasingly prominent over the past decade because the federal 
government has been unable to settle on a national energy policy.65  States 
have adopted innovative policies that read like a menu of proposals to 
transform energy markets—renewable power standards,66 cap-and-trade 
systems,67 utility rate decoupling,68 coal-power phaseouts,69 renewable 
 
 62. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 31, at 802–03, 806 (describing state role in 
regulating mix of power sources and retail energy prices and conditions). 
 63. Steven J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid:  A New Era in Transmission 
Siting Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) (“[S]tates have most of the regulatory 
authority in the electricity industry.”); see also Pierce, supra note 23, at 466. 
 64. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788–89 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“States serve as laboratories for the development of new social, 
economic, and political ideas. This state innovation is no judicial myth. . . .  Utility 
regulation itself is a field marked by valuable state invention.”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. E. 
Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 489 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Long before the Federal 
Government could be stirred to regulate utilities, courageous states took the initiative and 
almost the whole body of utility practice has resulted from their experiences.”); see also 
David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism:  The Case Against 
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); William 
W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise:  Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and 
Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 154, 157 (2007); Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance:  Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 189 (2002). 
 65. Rossi, supra note 3, at 401 (“[S]tate and local governments have taken a particularly 
aggressive approach to addressing climate change, in many instances beating federal 
regulators and Congress to the punch.”); see Klass & Wilson, supra note 4, at 1809 (“In the 
absence of comprehensive federal policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and with few 
federal policies to require renewable energy development, states have taken an active role in 
developing their own policies to promote renewable energy.”); Vivian E. Thomson & Vicki 
Arroyo, Upside-Down Cooperative Federalism:  Climate Change Policymaking and the 
States, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2011). 
 66. Renewable power standards require that a certain percentage of electricity generation 
come from sources that are designated “renewable,” such as solar power and wind power. 
Roger Martella et al., North American and Global Integration of Carbon Control Markets, in 
2 THE LAW OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN CANADA 19-7 (Dennis Mahony ed., 2d ed. 2012).  Over 
half of the states now have these standards. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Today in Energy:  
Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/ 
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850 (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (stating that “30 States and 
the District of Columbia had enforceable RPS or other mandated renewable capacity 
policies, as of January 2012”). 
 67. California as well as a group of East Coast states have adopted cap-and-trade 
systems to control greenhouse gas emissions. Coleman, supra note 4, at 115 n.115, 125–26.  
In cap-and-trade systems, polluters must have a permit for each ton of pollution that they 
emit, and they can purchase these permits from other companies or from the government, but 
the government limits the number of permits, placing an overall cap on emissions. Id. at 91 
& nn.8–9. 
 68. Ten states have decoupled utility compensation from energy consumption with the 
intent of encouraging energy conservation. NAT’L ASS’N OF REG. UTILS. COMM’RS, 
DECOUPLING FOR ELECTRIC & GAS UTILITIES:  FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 6 (2007), 
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/supp_mat_decoupling_elec_gas_utilitie
s.pdf.  Traditionally, price-regulated electric and natural-gas utilities are paid per unit of 
energy that they deliver, which means utilities benefit if they can encourage their customers 
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energy subsidies,70 and low-carbon fuel standards.71  State regulation of 
energy has never been more important.72 
But state regulation is being forced to adapt to rapidly integrating 
national markets in energy commodities like fuel and electricity.  As energy 
markets have grown too large for a single state to encompass, state 
regulators have responded by asserting broader authority, regulating in-state 
transactions with the aim of influencing extraction and consumption of fuel 
in other states, and thus exporting their energy policy to other states. 
A.   Restrictions on Electricity Import 
The most prominent targets of exported state regulations are the sources 
of imported electricity.  As noted, if states simply ignored the sources of the 
electricity that they import, imported energy could make their innovative 
energy policies futile as a response to climate change.  Thus, states are 
addressing out-of-state power sources through cap-and-trade systems, 
renewable portfolio standards, and coal-power moratoriums. 
California recently adopted a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas 
emissions.73  Under this system, California utilities must purchase a permit 
for each ton of greenhouse gases that they emit when they produce 
 
to use energy extravagantly. Id. at 2–3.  Decoupling removes this incentive by adjusting 
payments to utilities so that they do not directly depend on energy use. Id. 
 69. In 2007 the state of Minnesota placed a moratorium on construction of coal-fired 
power plants. MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subdiv. 3(2) (2011). 
 70. Nearly every state has some kind of financial incentive for renewable energy, 
whether implemented through grants, loans, or personal or corporate taxes. S. GOUCHOE ET 
AL., CASE STUDIES ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE 
ENERGY 7–16 (2002), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy02osti/32819.pdf. 
 71. California Low Carbon Fuel Standard, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–95490 
(2012).  A low carbon fuel standard, unlike most fuel standards, does not merely regulate 
emissions from burning fuel. Instead, it regulates all greenhouse gas emissions associated 
with fuel production, including emissions in extracting and refining the fuel as well as other 
emissions indirectly caused by fuel production.  Thus, California’s low carbon fuel standard 
regulates the “life-cycle emissions” of fuel used in California, which means: 
[T]he aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas emissions (including direct emissions 
and significant indirect emissions such as significant emissions from land use 
changes), as determined by the Executive Officer, related to the full fuel lifecycle, 
including all stages of fuel and feedstock production and distribution, from 
feedstock generation or extraction through the distribution and delivery and use of 
the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the mass values for all 
greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their relative global warming 
potential. 
Id. § 95480.1(a)(38); see also id. §§ 95480–95490. 
 72. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1097 (2009) (arguing for states’ potential for innovative climate change regulation); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 971, 978–81 
(2013) (arguing in favor of fracking and suggesting that states should be the locus of 
fracking regulation because of states’ potential for innovative regulation); see also Uma 
Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels:  Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L. 
REV. 1679, 1693 (2012) (noting that most policy progress on renewable energy has been 
limited to the “the state and local level”). 
 73. California Cap On Greenhouse Gas Emissions And Market-Based Compliance 
Mechanisms, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95800–96023 (2012). 
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electricity.74  But California imports electricity from other states in the 
Southwest and Pacific Northwest.75  If California ignored the greenhouse 
gases produced in these other states, imported electricity would have a 
significant advantage over California electricity—it would be cheaper 
because out-of-state producers would not need to purchase permits for their 
greenhouse gas emissions.  As a result, California’s cap-and-trade system 
would be undercut—greenhouse gas emissions would shift to other states as 
industrial consumers switched to cheaper electricity and out-of-state power 
plants ramped up production.76  These out-of-state greenhouse gas 
emissions would be just as bad for California as in-state emissions because 
the effects of global warming do not depend on where the emissions 
occur.77  And net greenhouse gas emissions might actually increase as 
power production shifted to states that do not limit emissions.78  Even 
worse, these states would become an increasingly powerful interest group 
against state or federal climate legislation that could undercut their 
competitive advantage by subjecting their emissions to comparable 
controls.79  As a result, California has decreed that it will regulate out-of-
state greenhouse gas emissions in the same manner as in-state emissions:  
electricity importers must purchase permits for emissions associated with 
their electricity no matter where those emissions occur.80 
 
 74. Id. § 95800(b)(1) (defining “covered entities to include ‘First Deliverers of 
Electricity’” including “Electricity generating facilities:  the operator of an electricity 
generating facility located in California”). 
 75. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California’s Major Sources of Energy, CA.GOV (2011), 
http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/overview/energy_sources.html (California imports 21 percent 
of its electricity from southwestern states like Arizona and Nevada and 8 percent from 
Pacific Northwest states like Oregon). 
 76. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 77. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
 78. Cf. Glen P. Peters et al., Growth in Emission Transfers via International Trade from 
1990 to 2008, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8903, 8904 (2011) (finding that greenhouse gas 
emissions leaked from E.U. countries to developed nations outweigh all reductions 
contemplated for the European Union under the Kyoto Protocol); see also Jonathan Baert 
Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation:  Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE 
L.J. 677, 695 (1999) (noting that estimates of likely leakage from the E.U. range “from 4% 
to more than 100% of the emissions abatement achieved initially”). 
 79. See Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block:  Incrementalism and 
National Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 286–87 (2010); 
Wiener, supra note 78, at 696 (describing this dynamic); see also Coleman, supra note 4, at 
25 (“If leakage is sufficiently large, unilateral regulation may be worse than nothing; it will 
increase emissions in other countries and harden resistance to greenhouse gas limits in the 
very countries where they are increasingly emitted.”). 
 80. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95800(b)(1) (2012) (defining “covered entities” to 
include “electricity importers”).  Electricity importers are responsible for submitting permits 
to cover all of their out-of-state emissions. Id. § 95852(b) (requiring permits for all emissions 
“from a source in California or in a jurisdiction where a GHG emissions trading system has 
not been approved for linkage;” to date, no neighboring jurisdiction has been approved for 
linkage).  California has also faced difficulty accounting for the “source” of electricity 
imports because electricity is drawn from an undifferentiated pool.  It may be attributed to a 
single source as a matter of accounting, but it is, in fact, derived from all generation 
connected to the grid. See James Coleman, Federal Court Strikes Down Minnesota’s Limits 
on Coal Power Imports:  A Critical Moment for State Regulation of Imported Fuel & 
Electricity, ENERGY COLLECTIVE (Apr. 24, 2014), http://theenergycollective.com/ 
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Minnesota faced a similar dilemma in 2007, when it placed a moratorium 
on construction of coal-fired power plants as part of climate legislation.81  
To ensure that this did not simply push new coal generation outside the 
state borders, the state banned import of electricity produced by new coal-
fired power plants.82  This restriction on electricity from new out-of-state 
coal power plants is not based on any characteristic of the electricity that is 
imported—the electricity itself is the same whether the electricity comes 
from an old coal plant, a new coal plant, a natural gas plant, or any other 
 
energylawprof/371881/federal-court-strikes-down-minnesota-s-limits-coal-power-imports-
critical-momen (explaining that “the interstate electric grid” is “a pool of power” making it 
impossible to trace the source of electricity).  Thus, California utilities are increasingly 
trading contracts that purport to come “from” coal plants to contracts that purport to come 
from low-carbon sources. Danny Cullenward, How California’s Carbon Market Actually 
Works, BULL. ATOM. SCI. (Aug. 12, 2014), http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/08/09/ 
0096340214546834.  Notably, another cap-and-trade system, the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, a cap-and-trade scheme designed by ten eastern states to stabilize and then slightly 
lower greenhouse gas emissions, does not apply to imported electricity. Coleman, supra note 
4, at 58.  This cap, however, has been very lax, limiting the danger of emissions leakage. 
JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41836, THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS 
INITIATIVE:  LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR POLICYMAKERS 8–9 (2013), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41836.pdf. The participating states, however, are now 
lowering the cap; depending on the result of this change, they may end up considering ways 
of preventing leakage in the future. Id. 
 81. MINN. STAT. § 216H.03 (2011).  In 2011, Minnesota’s Governor vetoed repeal of 
this moratorium. Eric Roper, Dayton Vetoes ‘Cheeseburger Bill,’ STAR TRIB. (May 27, 
2011), http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/122757954.html. In the same year, the 
Canadian province of Ontario went even further, phasing out existing coal-fired power 
plants. Cessation of Coal Use—Atikokan, Lambton, Nanticoke and Thunder Bay Generating 
Stations, O. Reg. 496/07 (Can.), http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/english/elaws 
_regs_070496_e.htm# (closing out coal-power plants by 2015). 
 82. MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subdiv. 3(2) (providing that no person shall “import or 
commit to import from outside the state power from a new large energy facility that would 
contribute to statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions”).  “Statewide power sector 
carbon dioxide emissions” are defined to include both “emissions of carbon dioxide from the 
generation of electricity within the state and all emissions of carbon dioxide from the 
generation of electricity imported from outside the state.” Id. subdiv. 2.  The ban however 
contained an exception for electricity imports if the new out-of-state coal facility offset its 
emissions by funding or committing to greenhouse gas reductions elsewhere to the 
satisfaction of Minnesota’s Public Utilities Commission. Id. subdiv. 4; id. § 216H.03(n).  
California adopted a similar policy that forbids electricity providers from entering into long-
term contracts with new coal-fired power plants whether they are inside or outside the state. 
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(a), (b)(1), (d)(1) (2008) (“No load-serving entity or local 
publicly owned electric utility may enter into a long-term financial commitment unless any 
baseload generation supplied under the long-term financial commitment complies with the 
greenhouse gases emission performance standard established by the commission” which 
must be set at “a rate of emissions of greenhouse gases that is no higher than the rate of 
emissions of greenhouse gases for combined-cycle natural gas baseload generation.”).  
Maine and Washington also passed coal-fired moratoriums, but these only applied to new in-
state sources. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 585-K(3) (2009) (“Between the effective date 
of this subsection and the earlier of the effective date of rules authorized pursuant to 
subsection 2 and August 1, 2011, the department may not issue any license or permit to a 
coal gasification facility that is not licensed under this chapter prior to August 1, 2008.”); 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Performance Standards, WASH. REV. CODE § 80.80.040(3)(b) 
(2011) (“All baseload electric generation that commences operation after June 30, 2008, and 
is located in Washington, must comply with the greenhouse gases emissions performance 
standard established in subsection (1) of this section.”). 
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type of power source.83  Instead, the restriction addresses out-of-state 
emissions.84 
Perhaps the most common type of exported energy regulation is 
accomplished through renewable portfolio standards—thirty-nine states 
now employ these standards.85  Renewable power standards require utilities 
to purchase a specified percentage of electricity generation from sources 
that are designated “renewable,” such as solar power and wind power.86  
Crucially, these standards do not require that in-state electricity producers 
generate a specified percentage of energy from renewable sources.  Instead, 
they require that electricity providers purchase a specified percentage of 
energy from renewable sources, which extends the renewable requirement 
to all sources that sell to the regulating state, even if they are located outside 
of the state.87  Of course, states could alter these standards so that they only 
apply to in-state power production, but so far they have not taken that 
route.88 
 
 83. Electricity is drawn from a national grid that pools power from numerous plants, so 
the notion that electricity comes “from” a particular plant is an accounting convention rather 
than a description of an observable physical phenomenon. See Samuel R. Brumberg, Getting 
the Camel Out of the Tent:  Behind the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Rise to 
Power and the Importance of States’ Continued Regulatory Oversight, 30 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 691, 697–98 (2006) (comparing accounting for electricity sources 
to a person in the United States paying a person in Spain for a cup of water with the water 
added to the Atlantic Ocean on one side and withdrawn on the other); Steve Ferrey, 
Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights:  Discerning the Energy 
Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507, 602 
(2004) (“As a matter of basic physics, an electron is an electron.”).  Of course, different 
power sources may produce different power profiles; for example, solar and wind energy do 
not produce a constant amount of power since they depend on variable sunshine and wind.  
The point, however, is that if a utility contracts to receive power with a given profile, it does 
not matter how that electricity is generated as long as it meets the profile. 
 84. Although there are also moratoria on other types of plants such as nuclear, those 
moratoria only apply to in-state construction. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, State 
Restrictions on New Nuclear Power Facility Construction, NESH.ORG (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/env-res/states-restrictions-on-new-nuclear-power-
facility.aspx. 
 85. Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care:  The Commerce 
Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY 
L. 59, 109–23 (2012); Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Back to Sleep:  Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295 (2013). 
 86. Klass & Wilson, supra note 4, at 1809; see also Patrick R. Jacobi, Note, Renewable 
Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements:  How States Can Stop Worrying 
and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 VT. L. REV. 1079, 1080–81, 1090 
(2006). 
 87. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 196.378(2)(a)(2)(d) (2012) (“[F]or the year 2015, each 
electric provider shall increase its renewable energy percentage so that it is at least 6 
percentage points above the electric provider’s baseline renewable percentage.”); MD. CODE 
ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-703(d) (West 2012) (“[A]n electricity supplier shall meet the 
renewable energy portfolio standard by accumulating the equivalent amount of renewable 
energy credits that equal the percentages required under this section.”). 
 88. They could also alter them to take better advantage of the market-participant 
exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, which allows states to favor in-state industry 
when purchasing goods or services for their own use. Ferrey, supra note 85, at 103–05.  See 
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The states’ decision to regulate electricity based on its source, rather than 
simply regulating in-state electricity production, places them in a bind 
under the dormant Commerce Clause.  A renewable power standard 
operates by demanding compliance credits from utilities and providing 
compliance credits to utilities that provide power from renewable sources.89  
This leaves states with three choices.  First, they can credit all out-of-state 
electricity as renewable but, as described above, that will quickly 
undermine the standard.  Second, they can refuse to credit all out-of-state 
electricity, but that would be discriminatory, violating the dormant 
Commerce Clause.90  Third, they can apply their own renewable power 
standard to out-of-state electricity, which also jeopardizes the regulation 
under the dormant Commerce Clause.91  States have generally chosen a mix 
of the second and third course, either refusing to credit out-of-state 
electricity or applying their regulation to the sources of that electricity in 
other states.92 
B.   Restrictions on Fuel Imports 
States also have adopted regulations that control fuel production even if it 
occurs in other states or countries.  California, again, has been an earlier 
experimenter with addressing out-of-state emissions.  In 2010, California 
adopted a “low carbon fuel standard.”93  The term is somewhat misleading:  
these standards do not limit the amount of carbon that fuel may contain; 
instead, they control the total amount of greenhouse gases that are emitted 
as a result of production, transport, and finally combustion of the fuels that 
are eventually retailed in California.94  That is, these standards attempt to 
measure and control the greenhouse gases that are emitted when (1) oil is 
extracted from the ground or when corn is grown for ethanol, (2) these 
feedstocks are transported to refiners, (3) refiners turn these products into 
fuel, (4) this fuel is transported to market, and (5) these fuels are burned in 
motor vehicles.95  They also attempt to account for any greenhouse gases 
 
generally Dan T. Coenen, State User Fees and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 VAND. L. 
REV. 795 (1997) (describing scope of the exception). 
 89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 90. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992); Dan Farber, Regulators 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place:  The Extraterritorial Dilemma, LEGAL PLANET (June 24, 
2013), http://legal-planet.org/2013/06/24/regulators-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-the-
extraterritorial-dilemma. 
 91. See infra Part III.A; Farber, supra note 90. 
 92. Ferrey, supra note 85, at 109–23. 
 93. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079–80 (E.D. 
Cal. 2011). 
 94. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–95490 (2012). 
 95. The standard regulates carbon intensity, which is defined as the “life-cycle 
emissions” of fuel used in California, which means “the aggregate quantity of greenhouse 
gas emissions (including direct emissions and significant indirect emissions such as 
significant emissions from land use changes), as determined by the Executive Officer, 
related to the full fuel lifecycle, including all stages of fuel and feedstock production and 
distribution, from feedstock generation or extraction through the distribution and delivery 
and use of the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the mass values for all 
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emitted when (6) farmers around the world use more land for growing 
biofuel feedstocks like corn rather than food or when (7) resulting food 
shortages encourage others to shift undeveloped land into farms.96  
California’s standard seeks to lower the sum total of all of these emissions, 
which, in aggregate, is known as the “carbon intensity” of a fuel.97 
Thus, carbon intensity is not an inherent quality of the finished product 
that is sold in state—two chemically identical gallons of ethanol or gasoline 
could have drastically different carbon intensities depending on how they 
were produced and transported across the globe.98  Instead, California’s 
low-carbon fuel standard is designed to address global fuel supply chains to 
“reduc[e] the carbon intensity of transportation fuels used in California by 
an average of 10 percent by the year 2020.”99  Other states are considering 
following suit:  Oregon and Washington are contemplating similar 
standards,100 and there have been efforts to adopt these standards in the 
group of eight northeast states known as the Northeast States for 
Coordinated Air Use Management.101 
C.   Restrictions on Fuel Exports 
Energy exporters are also exporting regulation.  As a combined result of 
pollution regulations and the natural gas boom, many utilities are using 
more natural gas and less coal, because gas has grown cheaper and 
produces less pollution.102  But U.S. coal producers have found new 
markets for their product:  increasingly they are exporting coal to Asia and 
 
greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their relative global warming potential.” Id. 
§§ 95480.1(a)(38); see also id. §§ 95480–95490. 
 96. Id. §§ 95480–95490. 
 97. Id. 
 98. CAL. AIR RES. BD., INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS V-30 (2009) (“[A] gallon of 
ethanol made from corn grown and processed in the Midwest will, under a microscope or 
other analytical device, look identical in every material way to a gallon of ethanol processed 
from sugar cane grown in Brazil.  Both samples of ethanol will have the same boiling point, 
the same molecular composition, the same lower and upper limits of flammability—in other 
words, both will have identical physical and chemical properties because both products 
consist of 100% ethanol.  On the other hand, the corn ethanol from the Midwest will have 
different carbon intensity than the sugar cane ethanol from Brazil.”). 
 99. Id. at ES-6 (describing Executive Order S-01-07). 
 100. Scott Learn, Oregon’s Low-Carbon Fuel Standard Faces Legislative, Legal Hurdles, 
OREGONIAN (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2012/04 
/oregons_low-carbon_fuel_standa.html; STATE OF WASH. DEP’T OF ECOL., A LOW CARBON 
FUEL STANDARD IN WASHINGTON:  INFORMING THE DECISION (2011), 
www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/docs/fuelstandards_finalreport_02182011.pdf. 
 101. NE. STATES FOR COORDINATED AIR USE MGMT., FINAL RESULTS:  ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF THE NORTHEAST/MID-ATLANTIC (NE/MA) CLEAN FUELS STANDARD (Sept. 
2011), http://www.nescaum.org/documents/cfs-econ-for-stakeholder-mtgs-sep-2011.pdf/.  At 
one time a low-carbon fuel standard was also considered by the six states (and one Canadian 
province) that joined the now-defunct Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord. See 
Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord, Midwestern Energy Security & Climate Stewardship 
Summit, Nov. 15, 2007. 
 102. F. Pratson, Drew Haerer & Dalia Patiño-Echeverri, Fuel Prices, Emission Standards, 
and Generation Costs for Coal Versus Natural Gas Power Plants, 47 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 
4926, 4926 (2013). 
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Europe where high natural gas prices are encouraging coal power.103  These 
exports present state energy regulators with a similarly perplexing problem:  
if state anti-coal regulations merely result in coal being burned elsewhere, 
they will not effectively address greenhouse gas emissions due to coal 
burning.104  Those emissions will have the same climate impact regardless 
of whether the coal is burned in the United States or across the globe in 
European and Asian countries importing U.S. coal.105 
As a result, state regulators have begun scrutinizing fuel exports as well.  
Proposals for new coal export facilities in the Pacific Northwest have been a 
particular flashpoint for conflicts regarding the effect of coal exports.  Two 
large coal export facilities are being planned to receive coal by rail from the 
Powder River Basin in Wyoming and Montana so that it can be shipped to 
Asia:  the Millennium Bulk Logistics Longview Terminal in Longview, 
Washington and the Gateway Pacific Terminal at Cherry Point near 
Ferndale, Washington.106  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which is 
responsible for considering the environmental impact of these facilities, and 
ultimately approving their construction, has said that its analysis will not 
consider the “burning of coal overseas” because those events are “outside 
the Corps’ control and responsibility.”107  The State of Washington, on the 
other hand, has declared that its analysis of the Longview Terminal will 
consider greenhouse gas emissions from “end-use coal combustion” 
because those emissions “contribute to climate change which in turn can 
 
 103. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Today in Energy:  Multiple Factors Push Western Europe 
to Use Less Natural Gas and More Coal, EIA.GOV (Sept. 27, 2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13151; Thomas K. Grose, As U.S. Cleans 
Its Energy Mix, It Ships Coal Problems Abroad, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2013), 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/03/130315-us-coal-exports. 
 104. Thus they may entirely fail to serve their purpose in combating global environmental 
problems like climate change.  In contrast, local pollutants will decrease if the coal is burned 
elsewhere, but even that may be problematic to the extent that a local regulator is concerned 
about local pollution in other parts of the globe. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 105. Even conventional pollutants such as particulate matter are increasingly reaching the 
United States from their sources across the Pacific Ocean. M. Huang et al., Impacts of 
Transported Background Pollutants on Summertime Western US Air Quality:  Model 
Evaluation, Sensitivity Analysis and Data Assimilation, 13 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & 
PHYSICS 359 (2013). 
 106. U.S. Energy Abundance:  Regulatory, Market and Legal Barriers to Export:  
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 133 Cong. (2013) (statement of Jennifer 
A. Moyer, Acting Chief, Regulatory Program, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs) [hereinafter U.S. 
Energy Abundance].  At one point there were also plans for exports from new facilities in 
Grays Harbor, Washington, and Coos Bay and St. Helens Bay, Oregon, but these plans have 
now been shelved. Associated Press, Company Shelves Hoquian Coal-Export Flow, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2018917971 
_coalexport15.html; Scott Learn, Port of Coos Bay Coal-Export Proposal Ends After 18 
Months of Work, OREGONIAN (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com 
/environment/index.ssf/2013/04/port_of_coos_bay_coal-export_p.html; Kim Murphy, Plans 
Shelved for Coal Export Terminal in Oregon, LA TIMES (May 8, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/08/nation/la-na-nn-coal-export-oregon-20130508. 
 107. U.S. Energy Abundance, supra note 106, at 5. 
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affect snow pack levels, ocean acidification and wildfire season in 
Washington.”108 
The same issues have arisen in consideration of liquefied natural gas 
exports from northwestern states.  Again, the federal government has shown 
little interest in considering the impact of burning natural gas overseas (or 
assessing emissions due to increased extraction of natural gas).109  FERC 
has exclusive authority to approve or deny siting, construction, and 
operation of liquefied natural gas facilities.110  Nevertheless, state 
governments have pushed for a larger role in federal approvals.111  
Environmental groups have urged federal and state regulators to leverage 
these permitting decisions to assess the combustion of exported natural gas 
in the overseas destinations that these facilities will serve.112 
The oil trade also has faced increased challenges from environmental 
groups concerned about the consequences of oil extraction in North 
America and oil consumption in U.S. trading partners.  In November 2013, 
an ordinance nearly passed in South Portland, Maine that would have 
banned any increased oil storage or transport because there were rumors 
that a pipeline leading from Montreal to South Portland would soon be 
carrying heavy crude from Canada for export overseas.113  A month after 
 
 108. Millennium Bulk Terminals-Longview Environmental Impact Statements, 
Frequently Asked Questions, State Environmental Policy Act Environmental Impact 
Statement, http://www.millenniumbulkeiswa.gov/frequently-asked-questions.html.  
Washington, however, warns:  “The analysis does NOT include evaluating environmental 
impacts within any country importing the coal.” Id. 
 109. See, e.g., FERC, SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION PROJECT MODIFICATION, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 66–67 (Apr. 2013); FERC, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR 
THE SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION PROJECT 2-99 to 2-100 (Dec. 2011), 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/EA-1845-FEA-2011.pdf.  FERC’s most recent 
environmental assessment, covering the Cove Bay LNG facility in Oregon also declined to 
perform a detailed study of the impact of LNG exports on global greenhouse gas emissions. 
FERC, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE COVE POINT LIQUEFACTION PROJECT 173–75 
(May 2014), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/enviro/eis/2014/05-15-14-ea/ea.pdf.  It did, 
however, highlight the environmental benefits that foreign countries would receive from 
burning natural gas instead of coal or oil. Id. at 175.  The Department of Energy also put out 
a policy paper on the general impact of LNG, which emphasized its potential climate 
benefits by comparing natural gas to coal rather than to alternative energy sources such as 
nuclear, hydropower, or wind power. TIMOTHY J. SKONE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, LIFE 
CYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS PERSPECTIVE ON EXPORTING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FROM THE 
UNITED STATES (2014), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/05/f16/Life%20Cycle% 
20GHG%20Perspective%20Report.pdf. 
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2012) (as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005)) (“The Commission shall have the exclusive authority to 
approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an 
LNG terminal.”). 
 111. See Motion to Intervene by the Oregon Department of Energy, LNG Development  
Co. v. Oregon Pipeline Co., L.L.C., Nos. CP09-6, CP09-6-001 (FERC July 11, 2013). 
 112. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Petition to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, State 
of Oregon, and State of Washington, http://action.sierraclub.org/site/PageNavigator/LNG_ 
Petition.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 113. See Waterfront Protection Ordinance (2013), http://www.southportland.org/ 
files/6713/7666/1956/1g_Actual_WPO_from_the_Citizens_Petition.pdf; Whit Richardson, 
South Portland Narrowly Rejects Attempt to Ban ‘Tar Sands Oil’ from Waterfront, BANGOR 
DAILY NEWS (Nov. 5, 2013), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/11/05 
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the ordinance was rejected, the city council placed a moratorium on exports 
of oil sands crude.114  And the Pacific Northwest has seen controversies 
about proposed oil exports as well.  A lease for a major terminal capable of 
transferring 360,000 barrels of oil per day from rail to ships and barges was 
approved in the Port of Vancouver, Washington over the objection of 
environmental groups.115  Three other terminals proposed for Gray’s 
Harbor, Washington received development permits from local authorities, 
but these permits were overturned by the Washington Shorelines Hearings 
Board, which ruled that the authorities had failed to consider the combined 
impact of all three terminals.116  The Port of Vancouver lease also has been 
challenged in court by environmental groups claiming that crude oil 
exported from the facility will exacerbate climate change when it is 
burned.117 
D.   Restrictions on Cross-State Shipments of Energy Goods and Equipment 
Given increasing efforts to address fossil fuel extraction and combustion 
indirectly through scrutiny of imports and exports, it may not be surprising 
that regulators and activists are looking further up and down supply chains 
to find more chokepoints that could slow the fossil fuel industry.  As a 
result, transstate shipments of fossil fuels and even fossil fuel extraction 
equipment have faced increased scrutiny in states across the country.  This 
increased scrutiny for fossil fuel transport has been accompanied by efforts 
to encourage states to support transmission of renewable power to support 
renewable industries in other states. 
Minnesota legislators, working with the climate action group MN350, 
recently proposed a bill that would place a fee on every gallon of oil that 
moved through the state either by rail or pipeline.118  The stated purpose of 
the bill is to fund emergency preparedness for crude-by-rail accidents, but 
the fee would apply to any mode of transportation, and MN350 has been 
clear that its ultimate goal is to shut down development of the oil sands in 
 
/politics/preliminary-vote-totals-show-south-portland-rejecting-attempt-to-ban-tar-sands-oil-
from-waterfront.  The moratorium has since been transformed into a permanent ban. Kelley 
Bouchard, South Portland Approves Law Barring Tar Sands Oil, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD 
(July 22, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/07/22/south-portland-set-for-final-vote-
on-tar-sands-ban. 
 114. Whit Richardson, South Portland Council Approves Moratorium on Tar Sands, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Dec. 17, 2013), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/12/17/politics 
/south-portland-council-passes-tar-sands-moratorium. 
 115. Scott Learn, Port of Vancouver Approves Big Crude Oil Terminal Amid Safety 
Concerns, OREGONIAN (July 25, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/environment 
/index.ssf/2013/07/port_of_vancouver_approves_big.html. 
 116. Quinault Indian Nation v. City of Hoquiam, No. 13-012c, 2013 WL 6062377 (Wash. 
Shore Hearing Bd. Dec. 9, 2013) (order on summary judgment). 
 117. Complaint, Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver (Clark Cnty. Ct. Oct. 2, 
2013), available at http://columbiariverkeeper.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Complaint-
Riverkeeper-v-Port-of-Vanc.pdf. 
 118. David Shaffer, Minnesota Legislators Push for Better Oil-Transport Disaster 
Response, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.startribune.com/business 
/245279801.html. 
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Canada.119  This effort builds upon a long history of attacking transport of 
fossil fuels to slow extraction and combustion of coal, oil, and gas.120  In 
the summer of 2013, Sierra Club and several other environmental 
organizations supplemented their legal attack on coal export facilities with a 
lawsuit against the railroad carrying coal through eastern Washington.121  
The suit alleged that coal dust from the trains was polluting federal waters 
in violation of the Clean Water Act.122  Environmental groups are looking 
to push even further up supply chains, suing to prevent shipments of 
equipment to the oil industry—known as “megaloads”—that travel on U.S. 
highways on their way to the oil sands in Canada.123 
Interstate electricity markets are also forcing state regulators to consider 
the impact of their decisions on emissions in other states.  Public utility 
commissions that must approve transmission lines now routinely consider 
the impact of transmission on electricity production in other states.124  For 
example, a transmission line from in-state windmills to out-of-state 
consumers could also provide those consumers with cleaner air if it 
displaced local coal power.125  FERC now requires states to consider the 
energy policies of other states in their transmission siting decisions.126 
III.   THE CASE FOR LIMITED FEDERAL AUTHORIZATION 
AND PREEMPTION OF STATE EXPORTED REGULATIONS 
State exported regulations are an understandable outgrowth of state 
leadership in energy regulation overlaid upon increasingly integrated energy 
 
 119. Grace Kelly, Danger of Oil Spills in Minnesota, MINN. PROGRESSIVE PROJECT (July 
16, 2013), http://mnprogressiveproject.com/30605 (arguing that pipelines should be rejected 
because “Canadian oil sands crudes” carried by them are “more greenhouse gas intensive” 
than average and it was “told by climate scientists that full development of tar sands oil will 
mean ‘Game Over’ for the climate”). 
 120. See, e.g., Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (holding environmental impact statement on new rail line inadequate for failure to 
consider the increased use of coal that the line would enable). 
 121. Sierra Club v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. 1:13-cv-00272-LRS, 2014 WL 53309 (E.D. 
Wash. Jan. 2, 2014). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 3:13-CV-348-BLW, 2013 WL 5592765 
(D. Idaho Oct. 10, 2013).  On the flip side, they have also pushed further downstream to 
regulate petroleum coke storage, which is a byproduct of refining oil sands crude. Tina 
Sfondeles, Rahm Emanuel to Propose Ordinance Prohibiting New Petcoke Facilities, CHI. 
SUN TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014, 6:44 AM), http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/25532779-
418/rahm-emanuel-to-propose-ordinance-prohibiting-new-petcoke-facilities.html. 
 124. Conversely, states making decisions about siting power generation facilities must 
consider likely transmission decisions in other states. See Outka, supra note 72, at 1692 n.45; 
Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217, 245–46 (2012) 
(exploring disparity between electricity generation siting which nominally remains in state 
control and siting regimes governing electricity and natural gas transmission); see also Tara 
Benedetti, Running Roughshod?  Extending Federal Siting Authority Over Interstate Electric 
Transmission Lines, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 253 (2010) (“While states have historically 
controlled the siting of interstate electric transmission lines, many federal legislators and 
regulators believe stronger federal authority over siting is necessary.”). 
 125. Stein, supra note 124, at 247–48. 
 126. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating 
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,846 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. 35). 
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markets.  But they are inconsistent with conventional dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence and present serious challenges for integrated national 
energy markets.  As a result, state regulations have been bogged down in 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges around the country.  The regulations 
present practical problems as well:  they present opportunities for state 
protectionism, threaten to undermine the federal government’s push for 
integrated national energy markets, and present courts with technical 
questions that are difficult to resolve under traditional modes of review.  To 
preserve both the benefit of state leadership in energy and climate policy 
and the achievement of integrated national energy markets, the federal 
government should authorize a limited subset of state exported regulations.  
Specifically, Congress should empower FERC to authorize state exported 
regulations so long as they do not discriminate against the out-of-state 
energy industry or splinter interstate energy markets. 
A.   Problem One:  Dormant Commerce Clause Litigation 
Many of the flagship state energy policies have been cast into doubt by 
lawsuits alleging violations of the dormant Commerce Clause.  Minnesota’s 
coal-power phaseout was challenged by North Dakota and was struck down 
by a Minnesota federal district court.127  California’s low-carbon fuel 
standard was first struck down by a federal district court in California,128 
then reinstated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.129  Complaints have 
also been filed against renewable power standards in Colorado, Delaware, 
Missouri, and Ohio.130  And neither the case law nor legal scholarship 
provides a strong basis for defending these lawsuits under current dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine. 
 
 127. North Dakota v. Heydinger, No. 11-cv-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014 WL 1612331, at 
*21–22 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2014) (holding that Minnesota’s import restriction necessarily 
regulated out-of-state conduct, violating the dormant Commerce Clause, because electricity 
on the grid “does not recognize state boundaries”). 
 128. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078–79 (E.D. 
Cal. 2011), rev’d, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).  In full disclosure, I represented some of 
the plaintiffs in this case until August 2011 when I left private practice.  I have had no 
involvement in the case since that time. 
 129. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013).  The 
decision made no reference to the protectionist motives that California used to explain its 
own regulation, see infra notes 175–83 and accompanying text, and explained its decision 
with a separate section arguing that “California should be encouraged to continue and to 
expand its efforts to find a workable solution to lower carbon emissions.” Corey, 730 F.3d at 
1106–07.  Seven circuit judges dissented from the denial of rehearing in the case. Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 130. See Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Early Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting 
Defendants and Intervenor-Defendants’ Early Motion for Summary Judgment, Energy & 
Envt. Legal Inst. v. Epel, No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-BNB (D. Colo. May 9, 2014) (dismissing 
dormant commerce clause claims); Brief for Appellant, In re Application of Champaign 
Wind L.L.C., No. 2013-1874 (Ohio Feb. 3, 2014); see also Nichols v. Markell, No. 12-777-
CJB, 2014 WL 1509780 (D. Del. Apr. 17, 2014) (allowing dormant Commerce Clause 
claims to proceed); Missouri ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 386 
S.W.3d 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Ferrey, supra note 85, at 69, 106–07. 
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The dormant Commerce Clause is the “negative implication” of 
Congress’s Article I, Section 8 authority “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”131  It disables states from regulating commerce in three ways.  
First, states may not impose burdens on interstate commerce that are 
“clearly excessive” in comparison to their legitimate local benefits; this is a 
balancing test known as the Pike test.132  Second, states may not 
discriminate between in-state and out-of-state commercial interests.133  
Third, states may not regulate with the aim “to control conduct beyond the 
boundaries of the State.”134  The Pike test does not present an existential 
threat to state energy regulation:  so long as states do not discriminate or 
regulate out-of-state activity, courts will afford their calculation of benefits 
and burdens wide latitude.135  The other two prohibitions—forbidding 
discrimination and extraterritoriality—are far more problematic. 
The discrimination test will have a significant impact on state energy 
regulation.  In pursuit of “green jobs” twenty-three of the nation’s thirty-
nine state renewable power standards discriminate between in-state energy 
and out-of-state energy.136  These discriminatory standards are unlikely to 
survive dormant Commerce Clause review.137  Although lawsuits against 
 
 131. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
 132. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates 
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”). 
 133. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988) (“This ‘negative’ 
aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism—that is, regulatory 
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state 
competitors.”). 
 134. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).  Under this doctrine, “the 
Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes 
place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within 
the State.” (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982)); see also C & A 
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994) (“States and localities may 
not attach restrictions to exports or imports in order to control commerce in other States.”). 
 135. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 347 (2007) (describing Pike test as “permissive” and rejecting “invitations to rigorously 
scrutinize economic legislation passed under the auspices of the police power”).  The 
Supreme Court has not struck down a state regulation under the Pike test since 1982. 
Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 417, 456 & n.220 (2008) (citing David S. Day, The ‘Mature’ Rehnquist Court 
and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine:  The Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D. 
L. REV. 1, 49 (2007)). 
 136. Ferrey, supra note 85, at 72 n.115.  This discrimination may have been inspired by 
national renewable standards across the globe that generally take this form and are now, in 
turn, the subject of international trade law disputes. Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next 
Generation of Trade and Environment Conflicts:  The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108 
NW. U. L. REV. 401, 452 (2014). 
 137. Nathan E. Endrud, State Renewable Portfolio Standards:  Their Continued Validity 
and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and 
Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 265 (2008); Ferrey, supra note 85, 
at 69, 106–07; Steven Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid:  Legal Challenges to 
Accommodate New Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977, 1004–05 (2009) 
(describing Commerce Clause issues when “states promote renewable resources in state to 
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these standards have not yet been decided, in a recent FERC case, Judge 
Posner described the dormant Commerce Clause as “an insurmountable 
constitutional objection” to Michigan’s discriminatory state standard.138 
Ultimately, however, the prohibition on discrimination will not vitiate 
state energy regulation:  states simply must modify their regulations to treat 
in-state and out-of-state power on an evenhanded basis.139  There is no 
environmental necessity to favor in-state power; indeed many states already 
employ nondiscriminatory power standards.140  Furthermore, apart from 
renewable power standards, many of the other state regulations are, at least 
on their face, nondiscriminatory.  For example, Minnesota’s coal-power 
phaseout seems to apply the same standard for in-state and out-of-state 
electricity:  no electricity from new coal-fired power plants.141 
The prohibition on extraterritorial regulation, however, is a mortal threat 
to nearly all exported energy regulation.  It forbids regulation with “the 
practical effect” of “control[ling] conduct beyond the boundaries of the 
State.”142  That forbidden effect is the aim of exported state energy 
regulation.  State regulation of imported fuel and electricity is designed to 
limit greenhouse gas emissions associated with producing that fuel and 
electricity out of state.143  A low-carbon fuel standard is designed to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions from production of fuels all over the world.144  A 
state cap-and-trade or renewable power standard is designed to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions from power plants in all of its electricity trading 
partners.145 
Although dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is famously murky 
and unsettled,146 the Court has made clear that a state may not “project its 
 
the exclusion of power produced out of state”); Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 ENVTL. ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 34 (2009). 
 138. Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 139. Ferrey, supra note 85, at 106 (“The state . . . must not discriminate based solely on 
geography.”). 
 140. Id. (“[S]ome RPS states facially discriminate based on geography, others de facto 
discriminate based on geography, and others do not discriminate.”). 
 141. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 142. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); see also Nat’l Solid Wastes 
Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1999) (“No state has the authority to 
tell other polities what laws they must enact or how affairs must be conducted outside its 
borders.”); id. at 1154 (“Wisconsin’s legislative power is limited to what happens in 
Wisconsin.”); Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 658–60 (7th Cir. 
1995) (stating that “a long line of cases . . . make clear that the Court will not hesitate to 
strike down a state law shown to have extraterritorial scope and an adverse impact on 
commerce occurring wholly outside the enacting state” and this “prohibition against direct 
regulation of interstate commerce by the states has been applied consistently by the 
circuits”). 
 143. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra Part II.B. 
 145. See supra Part II.A. 
 146. Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend:  A Game Theoretical Analysis of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 10 (2003) (dormant 
Commerce Clause “pervasively viewed as ‘incoherent’ and ‘hopelessly confused’”); see also 
Kristin E. Hickman & Sarah L. Bunce, Foreword:  DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno and the 
Constitutionality of State Tax Incentives for Economic Development, 4 GEO. J. L. & PUB. 
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legislation” into a neighboring state.147  The “Commerce 
Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that 
takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the 
commerce has effects within the State.”148  Although there is an active 
debate on the current scope of the extraterritoriality doctrine,149 even its 
critics and those who believe it is largely “dead”150 admit that it continues 
to forbid any regulation that is designed to “project[]” state regulation into 
another state or “control” activity in another state.151 
In fact, modern extraterritoriality doctrine flows from a case that closely 
parallels exported state energy regulation.  In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 
Inc.,152 the U.S. Supreme Court heard a challenge to a New York statute 
that set the minimum price at which milk could be purchased from dairies.  
To ensure that cheaper Vermont dairies did not undercut New York’s 
mandated dairy price, New York also dictated that milk could not be 
retailed within the state unless it had been purchased from a dairy at the 
New York price.153  Justice Cardozo, writing for a unanimous court, struck 
down the regulation, holding that New York had no power “to suppress or 
mitigate the consequences of competition between the states.”154  He 
acknowledged that the Court’s decision would undercut New York’s efforts 
to provide more protection than Vermont for the well being of its dairies.155  
The price paid for the Constitution was that “the several states must sink or 
swim together” because “in the long run prosperity and salvation are in 
union and not division.”156  If a state “may guard [its industry] against 
competition with [other states], the door has been opened to rivalries and 
 
POL’Y 15, 21 (2006) (“The Court has acknowledged that its case-by-case approach toward 
policing the boundary between the Commerce Clause and state tax policy has resulted in 
‘much room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the 
States in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation.’” (quoting Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 403 (1984))). 
 147. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935).  Baldwin is “sometimes 
called the father of the modern extraterritoriality doctrine.” Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 
700 F.3d 796, 815 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 148. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982). 
 149. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 127 (2014). 
 150. Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause:  A 
Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 980 (2013). 
 151. Id. at 992 (noting courts strike down laws “where it is clear that a statute seeks to 
enable State A to control activities occurring in State B, or to use Baldwin’s phrase, where 
State A is ‘projecting’ its legislation into State B”); see also Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 
815 (criticizing the extraterritoriality doctrine but reaffirming the importance of Baldwin’s 
rejection of “duties designed to neutralize advantages . . . [of] place of origin” (quoting 
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527)); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335–36 (1989) (noting “the 
Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union 
unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the 
individual States within their respective spheres”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The 
Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785 (2001). 
 152. 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
 153. Id. at 519. 
 154. Id. at 522. 
 155. Id. at 522–23. 
 156. Id. at 523. 
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reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the 
states to the power of the nation.”157 
Justice Cardozo also stressed that New York could restrict the sale of 
milk if something was wrong with the milk itself,158 but could not 
“neutralize advantages” created by Vermont’s lack of pricing regulation.159  
After all, he noted, if New York could set the minimum price for milk, “the 
next step would be to condition importation upon proof of a satisfactory 
wage scale in factory or shop”160—i.e., states could also demand that 
retailers only sell goods that had been produced by workers earning a 
minimum wage.  States and cities with protective labor and employment 
standards naturally feel aggrieved when their prices are undercut by imports 
from parts of the country without these standards.  Barring trade 
agreements, nations may close their borders to goods from other nations 
with poor labor or environmental standards.  But if every state and locality 
could prohibit the purchase of goods from anywhere else that did not meet 
its labor standards that “would be to invite a speedy end of our national 
solidarity.”161 
New York’s milk regulation closely parallels California’s low-carbon 
fuel standard and Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act.162  As in 
Baldwin the regulated product is a commodity:  milk is the same whatever 
the price paid to the dairy, just as electricity sold in Minnesota is no 
different whether it came from a coal-fired plant in North Dakota or from 
wind generation,163 and just as gasoline sold in California is no different 
whether it came from the oil sands in Canada or a tight oil play in Texas.164  
Just as in Baldwin, the justification for regulation is competitive:  if 
Minnesota and California only imposed the burden of regulation on in-state 
greenhouse gas emissions, their oil and electricity industries would be 
undercut by out-of-state producers.165 
 
 157. Id. at 522. 
 158. Id. at 524. 
 159. Id. at 527. 
 160. Id. at 524. 
 161. Id. at 523.  The Court’s strongest statement of this principle appeared in BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore: 
We may assume, arguendo, that it would be wise for every State to adopt Dr. 
Gore’s preferred rule . . . But while we do not doubt that Congress has ample 
authority to enact such a policy for the entire Nation, it is clear that no single State 
could do so, or even impose its own policy choice on neighboring States. 
517 U.S. 559, 570–71 (1996). 
 162. Minnesota Next Generation Energy Act, MINN. STAT. § 216H.03 (2011), invalidated 
by North Dakota v. Heydinger, No. 11-CV-3232 SRN/SER, 2014 WL 1612331 (D. Minn. 
Apr. 18, 2014). 
 163. See Brumberg, supra note 83, at 697–98. 
 164. CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 98, at V-30. 
 165. See supra notes 73–80 and accompanying text.  Alternatively, California has 
sometimes argued that it has “assumed legal and political responsibility for emissions of 
carbon resulting from the production and transport, regardless of location, of transportation 
fuels actually used in California.” Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. 
Supp. 2d 1071, 1091–92 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (emphasis added).  This of course, makes matters 
worse, as it amounts to an admission that it has violated Baldwin’s prohibition on 
“project[ing]” state regulation into other states. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521; see also C & A 
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It does not help states to argue that the ultimate transaction they are 
regulating—a sale of fuel or electricity—takes place within their 
jurisdiction.  By necessity, states only regulate transactions within their 
borders; the point of the prohibition on extraterritorial regulation is that 
states cannot leverage in-state regulation to control actions elsewhere.  Just 
as New York restricted retail of milk within the state based on the price that 
was paid for it out of state, states are regulating in-state electricity and fuel 
sales based on the greenhouse gas emissions used to produce them out of 
state.  Simply put, exported energy regulations violate the Court’s 
consistent command that “[s]tates and localities may not attach restrictions 
to exports or imports in order to control commerce in other [s]tates.”166 
State cap-and-trade and renewable power standards likely meet the same 
fate under conventional dormant Commerce Clause analysis.  If they only 
applied to in-state emissions, they would avoid dormant Commerce Clause 
scrutiny.  But they apply to emissions in the supply chain of electricity, 
even though electricity, like milk, is the same regardless of how it was 
produced.  Of course, like Minnesota and California’s statutes, it is quite 
possible that some of these statutes may ultimately survive legal challenges.  
Some may be upheld in court,167 some may never be challenged, and 
industry may choose to settle some challenges while leaving most of the 
programs intact, as it did in lawsuits against renewable power standards in 
Massachusetts and New York.168  Nevertheless, under conventional 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine these exported regulations will remain 
in legal jeopardy.169 
 
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994) (finding that states may not 
“extend [their] police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds”). 
 166. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393. 
 167. Indeed, the low-carbon fuel standard was ultimately upheld by the Ninth Circuit over 
the dissent of seven judges. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507 (9th 
Cir. 2014); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).  The 
judges in that case decided that the Supreme Court’s extraterritoriality cases only forbid 
extraterritorial price regulation, not extraterritorial regulation of how items are produced in 
other states.  Under this reasoning, California could forbid the importation of any goods 
produced in a way that it did not favor.  California has already leapt at the opportunity:  
forbidding the importation of eggs that came from chickens that were not treated up to 
California’s standards. Complaint, Missouri ex. rel. Chris Koster v. Harris, No. 1:14-AT-
00067 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2014). Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning California could, of 
course, also forbid imports from any state or country that did not follow California’s 
environmental standards or labor standards. 
 168. Complaint at 1, Transcanada Power Mktg., Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 40070-FDS (C.D. 
Mass. 2010); Partial Settlement Agreement at 1, Transcanada Power Mktg., No. 40070-
FDS, available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/settlement-
agreement.pdf. 
 169. A further possibility is that the courts could abandon the long-standing 
extraterritoriality doctrine.  From a policy perspective, courts may believe it is more 
important to “encourage[] [states] to continue and to expand [their] efforts to find a workable 
solution to lower carbon emissions” than to insist on constitutional limits on intranational 
trade barriers. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1107.  Climate regulation advocates could join forces with 
conservative thinkers that have long expressed discomfort with the extraterritoriality 
doctrine. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 344–45 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment); Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 810–15 (6th Cir. 
2012) (Sutton, J., concurring); Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 151.  These critics generally 
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On the other hand, state regulation of fossil fuel exports and regulation of 
cross-state energy and energy equipment transport fares better in a dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis for two reasons.  First, many of the state 
regulations involved—denying permits for export and transport facilities—
would be difficult to challenge under the dormant Commerce Clause.170  
Given the multitude of factors that go into state permitting decisions, it 
would be difficult for a federal court to invalidate a state decision to reject 
an export facility even if the decision rested, in part, on a consideration of 
out-of-state emissions associated with the export’s supply chain.171  
Second, even if export controls also are motivated by concern over 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with fossil fuel use, laws like 
 
argue that the dormant Commerce Clause should only be used to strike down discriminatory 
state laws, so the extraterritoriality test is unnecessary and imprecise. Healy, 491 U.S. at 
344–45; Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 810–15; Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 151.  It is 
better to focus on discrimination, they say, because “innumerable valid state laws affect 
pricing decisions in other States,” so how can courts strike down laws on the basis of their 
extraterritorial effect? Healy, 491 U.S. at 345.  Trade law, however, has long answered this 
puzzle:  regulations are extraterritorial and thus invalid only when, as in Baldwin, the 
regulation is targeted at out-of-state decisions.  There is a simple way to tell if a regulation is 
aimed at out-of-state production:  (1) does the regulation address a characteristic of the 
product itself or (2) does it address how the product was made?  Regulation of a product’s 
characteristics often affects manufacturing and pricing decisions in other states and Justice 
Scalia is correct that these incidental effects are acceptable. Id.  But restricting imports of 
products based on how they were made is the archetypal trade restriction.  If the United 
States banned the sale of products produced by workers who were not paid the U.S. 
minimum wage, it would cut off most imports from the developing world.  Similarly, if 
California required that products sold within its borders be manufactured in compliance with 
all of its labor and environmental standards, the practical result of this nondiscriminatory law 
would be a complete ban on imports:  labor and environmental standards differ from state to 
state and nation to nation so only California products would qualify for sale in California.  
Any coherent rule against trade restrictions must include an extraterritoriality rule as well as 
an antidiscrimination rule.  Thus, the new climate regulations expose a flaw in the 
conservative critique of the extraterritoriality doctrine.  For example, California pays a 
higher minimum wage. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1182.12 (West 2014) (setting minimum wage 
at $9.00 per hour as of July 1, 2014).  Imagine that California prohibited sale of any product 
that was not manufactured by workers paid its minimum wage.  Such a regulation would be 
perfectly nondiscriminatory—it would apply equally to workers inside or outside California.  
But it would be extraterritorial.  For that reason, it would violate not only intranational trade 
principles but also U.S. international trade agreements.  Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 
13 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (1996) (“We reject the use of labour standards for 
protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly 
low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question.”).  If the dormant 
Commerce Clause prevents states from forbidding imports, it must include an 
extraterritoriality prong. 
 170. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:  Making Sense of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1258 (1986) (explaining that the 
Supreme Court has been more forgiving of regulations of export than import). 
 171. But see Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. South Dakota, 236 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1018 
(S.D. 2002) (holding that siting regulation violated dormant Commerce Clause by imposing 
administrative burdens that would prevent a pipeline from being built).  Indeed, when 
Oregon recently rejected a moderate-sized coal export facility it rested its decision on local 
water quality impacts rather than the extraterritorial climate impacts that brought attention to 
the planned facility. STATE OF OREGON, SUMMARY OF THE COYOTE ISLAND TERMINAL PERMIT 
DECISION (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.oregon.gov/dsl/PERMITS/docs/cit_decision 
_summary.pdf. 
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Minnesota’s proposed oil shipment fees are, in part, aimed at local impacts 
including the danger of crude oil spills.172  Minnesota has not, for instance, 
proposed distinguishing among the types of crude transported through the 
state based on their different out-of-state emissions.173  Although they 
would likely survive judicial review, these mixed-motive regulations, like 
state regulation of imported fuel and electricity present practical problems 
for national energy markets, as explored in the next section. 
B.   Problem Two:  Splintering Energy Markets 
The problems with exported state energy regulation are not merely legal.  
These regulations provide states with a strong temptation to engage in 
protectionism, which in turn threatens to splinter national energy markets.  
In Baldwin, Justice Cardozo warned that allowing one state to project its 
regulation into another would mean “the door has been opened to rivalries 
and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce 
between the states to the power of the nation.”174  State exported 
regulations have confirmed this prediction.  The most obvious example is 
state renewable power standards that explicitly favor in-state power.  But 
protectionism is ubiquitous in state exported energy regulations, taking both 
blatant and subtle forms. 
California’s low-carbon fuel standard demonstrates how even well-
intentioned regulation presents a temptation toward protectionism.  The 
low-carbon fuel standard was authorized by Governor Schwarzenegger in 
January 2007 as part of California’s efforts to cut its greenhouse gas 
emissions back to 1990 levels by 2020.175  Scientists from the University of 
California system set its initial design, which was supposed to incorporate 
the most recent research on fuel lifecycles.176 
During its implementation, the low-carbon fuel standard was quickly 
altered based on more parochial concerns.  For example, the standard was 
supposed to strictly penalize the sale of fuel derived from unconventional 
heavy oils because those oils require more energy to extract.  Thus, it 
implemented punishing carbon intensity scores for fuels from Canada and 
 
 172. On the other hand, it is possible that Minnesota’s law would be subject to a 
preemption challenge under the Pipeline Safety Act. See 49 U.S.C. § 60104(c) (2012) (“A 
State authority may not adopt or continue in force safety standards for interstate pipeline 
facilities or interstate pipeline transportation.”). 
 173. Some outward focused energy transport regulations affirmatively enable interstate 
commerce.  For example, FERC has now authorized, indeed required, states to consider the 
impact of their electric transmission siting decisions on other states’ renewable energy 
industries. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and 
Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,846 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 
C.F.R. 35). 
 174. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
 175. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079 (E.D. 
Cal. 2011). 
 176. See generally ALEXANDER E. FARRELL & DANIEL SPERLING, A LOW-CARBON FUEL 
STANDARD FOR CALIFORNIA PART 1:  TECHNICAL ANALYSIS (2007), available at 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6j67z9w6. 
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Venezuela.177  But California could not bring itself to regulate its own oil so 
strictly, so it exempted unconventional California oil despite its similar 
emission profile.178  In tandem, these decisions meant that the standard 
insulated California heavy oil from foreign competition.  California also did 
not rely on the U.S. government’s standard model, known as GREET, for 
estimating emissions associated with producing ethanol.179  Instead, it 
created an alternate California model, CA-GREET, that broke up ethanol 
into two geographical categories, “California” and “Midwest.”180  
California’s modified model consistently assigned “a higher [carbon 
intensity] score to the ethanol produced in the Midwest and [a] lower score 
to the ethanol produced the same way in California.”181 
By the time that California’s regulation was finally adopted, the state was 
explaining its protectionist impulses forthrightly, noting that “[o]ne of the 
key advantages of the [standard] . . . is that it reduces our dependence on 
foreign oil,” and would “reduc[e] the volume of transportation fuels that are 
imported from other states.”182  As California explained:  “Displacing 
imported transportation fuels with biofuels produced in the State keeps 
more money in the State.”183  From its original aim of reducing out-of-state 
greenhouse gas emissions, a well-intentioned if constitutionally suspect 
goal, the purpose of the standard gradually shifted to fuel industry 
protectionism. 
Given the detours taken by such well-intentioned regulations, it is not 
surprising that state renewable power standards also have resulted in 
protectionist battles.  As one commentator noted, “[n]o renewable energy 
mandate passed a state legislature without the promise of thousands of new 
jobs,” so legislatures have insisted that the renewable power mandated by 
the standards be developed within the state.184  For this reason, over half of 
renewable power standards explicitly discriminate in favor of in-state 
renewable energy.185  As a result, these renewable power standards are 
 
 177. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, No. CV-F-09-2234 LJO DLB, slip 
op. at *17–21 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011) (order granting summary adjudication motion for 
National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n). 
 178. Id.  After its regulation was enjoined by the district court, California introduced 
regulatory amendments that calculate emissions for California’s heavy oil, but continue to 
favor it by treating it as part of the same batch as light oil from California and other 
jurisdictions.  See CAL. AIR RES. BD., FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS:  AMENDMENTS TO THE 
LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD REGULATION (2012). 
 179. CAL. AIR RESOURCES BD., supra note 178, at 16. 
 180. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1086–87. 
 181. Id. at 1089.  California justified its modification to the federal model by pointing 
further up the supply chain, noting that Midwestern ethanol facilities rely on electricity from 
power plants that, in turn, produce greater greenhouse gas emissions. Id. at 1088.  The point, 
however, is that it is simple to alter a model and the boundaries of a lifecycle analysis to 
achieve a result that will favor in-state industry. 
 182. Id. at 1079–80. 
 183. CAL. AIR RES. BD., FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS:  CALIFORNIA’S LOW CARBON 
FUEL STANDARD 479 (2009). 
 184. John Farrell, In-State Renewable Energy Development and the Commerce Clause, 
INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.ilsr.org/state-renewable-energy-
development-and-commerce-clause. 
 185. Ferrey, supra note 85, at 72 n.115. 
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working at cross-purposes with FERC efforts to integrate state electricity 
markets. 
State renewable power standards also incorporate more subtle 
discrimination.  For example, most of the New England states exclude 
inexpensive Canadian hydropower from their renewable power standards 
through limitations on the construction date and size of qualifying 
hydroelectric projects.186  Despite its low-carbon emission profile, 
Massachusetts environmental groups opposed even transmitting 
hydropower to Massachusetts for fear that transmission might be a first step 
to altering the state’s renewable power standard to credit hydroelectricity 
from Quebec.187 
C.   Solution:  Federal Supervision of Exported State Energy Regulation 
To preserve the benefits of state leadership on energy policy as well as 
the benefits of integrated national energy markets, the federal government 
must supervise exported state regulation.  Specifically, Congress should 
direct FERC, with input from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
to authorize state regulations that are nondiscriminatory and do not threaten 
to splinter interstate markets.188  Several alternative mechanisms could 
work, but ideally FERC should be required to review and approve, modify, 
or reject all exported energy regulations within 180 days of a state 
application for authorization, subject to judicial review.  The dormant 
Commerce Clause is an inference from congressional silence, so 
congressional authorization would insulate approved regulation from 
constitutional attack.189 
To institute FERC review, Congress should provide a prospective date on 
which state exported energy regulations would be preempted.190  The date 
should leave sufficient time for FERC to review state applications and 
approve their renewable power standards, low-carbon fuel standards, and 
 
 186. Scott Thistle, LePage Continues Effort to Lower Energy Costs for Maine 
Ratepayers, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 7, 2014, 7:46 PM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2014/01/05/politics/lepage-continues-effort-to-lower-energy-
costs-for-maine-ratepayers. 
 187. Editorial, Gains Outweigh the Costs for Hydropower from Quebec, BOS. GLOBE 
(Sept. 15, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2013/09/15/hydropower-
from-quebec-worth-pursuing-despite-concerns-about-power-lines/oPe8tp1ZLCH9 
kqM9eEqH6O/story.html (recommending that the transmission be approved but the 
renewable power standard not be changed to ensure the health of Massachusetts’ 
“burgeoning wind and solar sectors”). 
 188. Pursuant to congressional authorization agencies may authorize or preempt state 
regulation. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (authorize); Jim Chen, A 
Vision Softly Creeping:  Congressional Acquiescence and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1790 (2004) (authorize); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency 
Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 524–25 (2012) (preempt). 
 189. See S. Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87–88 (1984); Prudential 
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 421–40 (1946). 
 190. The statute should preempt “all state regulation of fuel, electricity, or other products 
within an energy supply chain that is predicated on the out-of-state consequences of 
producing or consuming that fuel or electricity.” 
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environmental assessment laws.191  Given the complexity of FERC’s task, it 
should also be given authority to extend the preemption drop-dead date if it 
falls behind in its review of state legislation. 
The scale of FERC’s proposed review, while significant, is not 
particularly unusual in the context of energy and environmental regulation.  
Under the Clean Air Act’s cooperative federalism framework, the EPA 
must review and approve comprehensive state plans for addressing several 
different pollutants subject to statutory deadlines.192  In fact, in the coming 
years, the EPA will have to review state renewable power standards anyway 
to determine whether those standards meet its forthcoming Clean Air Act 
standards for greenhouse gas emissions from existing fossil fuel–fired 
power plants.193  FERC’s review of state energy regulations could be 
coordinated with the EPA’s review of those standards under the Clean Air 
Act.194 
This reform also would not significantly expand federal supervision of 
state energy laws.  State energy laws limited to in-state emissions would not 
be preempted.195  For example, state emission standards, energy efficiency 
standards, and incentive programs would not be affected.196  Further, if 
states adjusted their renewable power standards to address in-state 
electricity production, only renewable power standards that focus on 
nationwide emissions associated with in-state consumption of electricity 
would be subject to FERC review.197  As a result, the laws reviewed by 
FERC would be the laws otherwise subject to review in federal court.  
 
 191. Because Congress undoubtedly has the power to preempt state regulation of 
interstate energy markets, this mechanism does not present a preclearance concern. See 
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013). 
 192. Ann E. Carlson, The President, Climate Change, and California, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
156, 158–59 (2013) (arguing that California’s cap-and-trade system should qualify as a state 
standard under 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)). 
 193. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:  Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) 
(providing for EPA review of a state plan that “establishes standards of performance for any 
existing source”). 
 194. The federal agencies have proven successful at coordinating policies across different 
agencies in response to climate change. Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s 
National Auto Policy:  Lessons from the “Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 347 
(2011) (describing collaboration of EPA and the Department of Transportation); see also 
Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1131 (2012). 
 195. See supra note 190 (stating the proposed text of preemption clause). 
 196. States have adopted numerous regulations and incentive programs that apply to in-
state sources from buildings to appliances to agricultural and industrial sources. Pace Law 
Sch. Ctr. for Envtl. Legal Studies, The State Response to Climate Change:  50-State Survey, 
in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 371 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007); see also 
Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives:  What Is Motivating State and 
Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About 
Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1017 (2006). 
 197. If a state chose not to submit an arguably preempted plan to FERC for review, it 
could, of course, be invalidated by a federal preemption lawsuit. 
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States would simply exchange judicial review for an expert administrative 
reviewer.198 
Although federal courts considering dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges commonly resolve questions of discrimination and market 
splintering, often labeled “Balkanization,”199 judicial review under the 
dormant Commerce Clause is a very blunt tool for policing state regulation 
of imported fuel and electricity.  Substantively, Baldwin and the 
extraterritoriality cases forbid all regulation of commodities based on how 
they were produced out of state.200  This rule seems appropriate for state 
laws forbidding imports from states with inconsistent minimum wage 
standards or labor laws, but it is too restrictive for innovative state energy 
programs. 
First, many of these regulations target greenhouse gas emissions, which 
have the same effect on global warming no matter where they are 
emitted.201  State competition may impose some economic disincentive to 
regulate water pollution,202 but even if regulating states lose industry and 
jobs, they will retain the benefit of clean water.  In contrast, when states 
burden their domestic industry with climate regulations, competition will 
also destroy the environmental benefits of their regulation:  in addition to 
losing jobs, increased out-of-state greenhouse gas emissions mean they will 
face the same harm from global warming.203  The EPA’s forthcoming rules 
for state power sector emissions may somewhat mitigate this problem by 
limiting each state’s power sector emissions, which theoretically should 
restrain industry from fleeing to neighboring states.204  But the plan does 
not hold all states to the same standard and leaves the most-polluting states 
 
 198. This choice would, of course, be consistent with settled administrative law doctrine 
that technical questions of policy are best resolved by agencies rather than courts. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984) (“[T]he 
principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently followed by this 
Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling 
conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given 
situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected 
to agency regulations.” (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961) (internal 
quotation omitted))). 
 199. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). 
 200. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392–93 
(1994); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 524 (1935). 
 201. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
 202. But see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:  Rethinking the 
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1210, 1229 (1992) (arguing that competition leads to improved regulation of environmental 
harms with local impacts); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal 
Environmental Regulation:  A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997) (same). 
 203. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text; see also Brewster, supra note 79, at 247 
(“[I]f higher environmental regulation in one nation leads to increased production of carbon-
heavy goods elsewhere, then the reductions in one nation may be offset or nullified 
completely by greenhouse gas production in other parts of the globe.”). 
 204. Carbon Pollution Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:  Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014). 
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with the loosest standards—leaving plenty of room for industry to flee 
regulating states.205 
Second, addressing the competitiveness problem posed by climate 
regulation is the most pressing dilemma for subglobal energy regulation:  
How can national climate regulations encourage rather than discourage 
action elsewhere?206  If states may not adopt regulations that mitigate the 
competitiveness concern, they will be largely useless as a model for the 
federal government or other governments around the world, forfeiting the 
benefits of states’ traditional role as laboratories of democracy for energy 
policy.207  Despite the protectionist temptation, some of the state 
regulations, while extraterritorial, impose only a minimal burden on 
commerce in other states.  For example, Minnesota’s limitation on 
electricity from new coal-fired plants in North Dakota is even-handed and 
leaves plenty of room for continuing electricity trade with all existing 
power plants in North Dakota and nearly all future plants.208  Some room 
for this kind of even-handed regulation of imported fuel and electricity is 
necessary so long as it does not splinter interstate markets, and FERC 
should have the power to authorize it. 
At the same time, the mere fact that out-of-state greenhouse gas 
emissions affect climate around the world, and in the regulating state, 
cannot justify a blanket authorization of extraterritorial state climate 
regulations.  Discriminatory regulations are plainly problematic because 
they will quickly carve the national energy market into fifty isolated 
enclaves.209  But even-handed regulations may also have this effect if they 
are totally unchecked.  For example, imagine that North Carolina chose to 
implement a 100 percent hydropower renewable power standard.  This 
regulation would be nondiscriminatory—it would apply equally to in-state 
and out-of-state sources—but practically speaking, it would turn North 
Carolina into an electricity island because utilities in neighboring states 
 
 205. Phillip Wallach & Alex Abdun-Nabi, The EPA’s Carbon Plan Asks the Least from 
States That Pollute the Most, WASH. POST (July 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/07/16/the-epas-carbon-plan-asks-the-least-from-states-that-
pollute-the-most.  Some key coal power plants, such as those that export electricity to 
California, are located on tribal land that is not covered by the new EPA standards. 
Cullenward, supra note 80, at 7. 
 206. See generally Coleman, supra note 4; see also Daniel A. Farber, Carbon Leakage 
Versus Policy Diffusion:  The Perils and Promise of Subglobal Climate Action, 13 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 359, 362–67 (2013). 
 207. These benefits are particularly crucial in the arena of climate and energy policy 
where federal policy is unsettled. See, e.g., Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal 
Preemption and the Clean Energy Floor, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1283 (2013) (criticizing 
preemption of state energy regulation that is more protective of the environment than federal 
law); Adelman & Engel, supra note 64, at 1834–35 (advocating less preemption of local 
regulation, even for national and international problems). 
 208. For more detail, see infra notes 66–81 and accompanying text. 
 209. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (“If New York, in 
order to promote the economic welfare of her farmers, may guard them against competition 
with the cheaper prices of Vermont, the door has been opened to rivalries and reprisals that 
were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the states to the power of the 
nation.”). 
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would have other power sources and North Carolina could not take their 
electricity.  Finally, if any climate impact could entirely negate dormant 
Commerce Clause constraints, trade in other commodities could be 
seriously impacted.  For instance, transport of fruits and vegetables leads to 
greenhouse gas emissions, but if a state could prevent the sale of produce 
that required significant greenhouse gas emissions to reach its consumers, 
national food markets would break down.210 
Procedurally, transferring review of exported regulations from the courts 
to FERC would bring significantly enhanced expertise to bear on the 
conundrums posed by exported energy regulations.  Whether these 
regulations are even-handed and whether they would splinter energy 
markets are questions that often turn on highly technical arguments that are 
not well aligned with the expertise of the judiciary or modes of judicial 
review.211  Indeed, the court tasked with resolving the dormant Commerce 
Clause dispute between North Dakota and Minnesota asked the parties sua 
sponte whether there was any way it could defer the decision to FERC.212  
Ultimately, it concluded there was no way to avoid the decision.213  Courts 
are not eager to resolve these disputes; they should be resolved by FERC.  
Similarly, it would be unwise to simply abrogate the extraterritoriality test 
for state energy regulation and continue relying on the courts to implement 
a rump dormant Commerce Clause analysis, striking down state regulations 
that were discriminatory or imposed excessive burdens on interstate 
commerce.214 
 
 210. California’s low-carbon fuel standard adopted exactly this kind of analysis for 
ethanol, punishing Midwestern ethanol producers for transporting their ethanol to California, 
and punishing California ethanol producers for transporting their corn from the Midwest to 
California. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1088 
(E.D. Cal. 2011). 
 211. This is consistent with the suggestion of numerous commentators that the new 
challenges of energy and climate regulation are best resolved by expert agencies, not the 
courts. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (arguing that courts should defer to agencies, which are best suited to 
resolve problems presented by fracking and climate change); Douglas A. Kysar, What 
Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 8–44 (2011) (arguing that courts 
are an impractical forum for resolving climate change disputes); see also Matthew C. 
Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power:  Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice 
Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1042–43 (2006) (describing the role 
of agency expertise in determining when decisions should be entrusted to agencies). 
 212. See North Dakota v. Swanson, No. 11-3232, 2012 WL 4479246, at *3 (D. Minn. 
Sept. 30, 2012). 
 213. Id. at *19. 
 214. The same criticism applies to other proposals to modify dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine to apply less searching review to state energy laws. See Kirsten H. Engel, The 
Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation:  The Case 
of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1999) (arguing for a broad dormant 
Commerce Clause exemption for state-created environmental markets); Daniel A. Farber, 
Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879 (2008) (arguing for 
a strong presumption against invalidating state climate regulation on dormant Commerce 
Clause grounds); Peter C. Felmly, Beyond the Reach of States:  The Dormant Commerce 
Clause, Extraterritorial State Regulation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 
467, 512 (2003); Lee & Duane, supra note 85, at 355–62 (arguing for intermediate scrutiny, 
market participant exception, and increased deference for state climate regulations); 
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For example, imagine how a court would assess reciprocal dormant 
Commerce Clause suits against two states with different scientific 
assessments of the climate impact of natural gas and coal power.  Natural 
gas power plants burn cleaner than coal power plants, emitting far less 
carbon dioxide, but natural gas production and transport emits methane, 
another greenhouse gas, that offsets some of this benefit.215  The most 
comprehensive literature surveys conclude that natural gas, on net, has a 
smaller climate impact than coal,216 but there is a legitimate and active 
scientific debate on this question, which may be the single most important 
question for the nation’s climate future.217  Scientific opinions on the total 
climate impact of natural gas stretch from those who say gas has only a 
third of the climate impact of coal218 to those who say gas actually has a 
larger impact.219  Now, imagine that a natural gas reliant state adopted a 
cap-and-trade system that attributed a very large climate benefit to gas and a 
neighboring coal-heavy state adopted a cap-and-trade system that labeled 
natural gas worse than coal.  Both states could point to a rigorous, peer-
reviewed scientific basis for their regulations—but how would a court 
respond to dueling dormant Commerce Clause lawsuits against these cap-
and-trade systems? 
A court in this situation has few palatable options.  Declaring one or both 
of the statutes constitutionally invalid would require wading into an active 
scientific debate.  But leaving both in place would carve up interstate 
energy markets as states adopt self-serving, but scientifically defensible, 
characterizations of electricity generated in other states.  The scientific 
battle over gas versus coal is just one part of a constant scientific battle over 
the climate benefits and drawbacks of nearly every energy source.  If 
scientists cannot even agree on the most basic issues, how can courts decide 
whether one ethanol factory truly has a smaller climate impact than another 
factory?  Lifecycle analyses, like that contained in California’s low-carbon 
fuel standard, vary so widely that states, relying on favorable published 
 
Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 
(2003); Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 34, 65–67 (2009).  It is also unlikely that the courts will 
choose to incorporate an entirely separate climate factor into their already complex dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis. 
 215. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 31, at 786 n.43 (describing debate). 
 216. A. R. Brandt et al., Methane Leaks from North American Natural Gas Systems, 343 
SCIENCE 733, 734 (2014). 
 217. For example, the widely reported drop in United States greenhouse gas emissions is 
a result of the assumption that natural gas has a smaller climate impact than coal. U.S. 
Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 2012, EIA.GOV (Oct. 
21, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon (“The increase in natural gas-
fired generation, while coal-fired generation decreased, substantially reduced the carbon 
intensity of electricity generation in 2012.”). 
 218. See Lawrence M. Cathles III et al., A Commentary on “The Greenhouse-Gas 
Footprint of Natural Gas in Shale Formations” by RW Howarth, R. Santoro, and Anthony 
Ingraffea, 113 CLIMATIC CHANGE 525, 533–34 (2012) (noting that “gas has less than half 
and perhaps a third the greenhouse impact as coal”). 
 219. See Robert W. Howarth et al., Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of 
Natural Gas from Shale Formations, 106 CLIMATIC CHANGE 679, 688 (2011). 
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studies, could justify restricting imports from nearly any energy source.  For 
example, a recent Nature study stated that, under certain circumstances, the 
land-use impacts of wind power could entirely wipe out its climate 
benefit.220  Of course, a federal agency would not build its policy on such 
an outlier view, regardless of the scientific rigor of the individual study.  
But a court would have difficulty striking down state regulations grounded 
on published scientific estimates, and that would be enough to justify 
inconsistent laws that could quickly splinter interstate energy markets. 
Nor do courts have the technical expertise to judge whether a given 
renewable power standard would cut a state off from interstate electricity 
markets to an unacceptable degree.  All such standards will place some 
burden on interstate commerce, so a balance needs to be struck reflecting 
federal policy on the need for both integrated energy markets and state 
innovation in energy regulation.  And that balance should reflect the best 
evidence of the impact of state regulations on interstate electricity trade.  
For example, at what level of stringency do renewable power standards 
amount to a de facto ban on import of electricity from neighboring states?  
Do standards that prescribe percentages for each type of renewable power 
isolate states at lower percentage goals?  FERC has the expertise to address 
these thorny questions and the courts do not.221 
Although courts are experts at balancing state and federal power, FERC 
also has the ability and the duty to consider the federalism dimensions of 
authorization and preemption questions.  When federal agency regulation 
has an impact on state authority, the agency must consider its federalism 
implications and must issue a Federalism Impact Statement under Executive 
Order 13,132.222  Furthermore, FERC has already been entrusted with 
implementing the cooperative federalism provisions of the Environmental 
Policy Act of 2005, which authorizes FERC to preempt state authority and 
approve facilities for “interstate electric transmission” if states are delaying 
 
 220. Jo Smith et al., Avoid Constructing Wind Farms on Peat, 489 NATURE 33 (2012).  
Similarly rigorous but outlier studies have from time to time been published, finding strong 
climate impacts from other technologies thought to be low carbon. See, e.g., Ethan S. Warner 
& Garvin A. Heath, Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Nuclear Electricity 
Generation:  Systematic Review and Harmonization, 16 J. OF INDUS. ECOL. S73 (2012). 
 221. This conclusion is consistent with an established literature on the benefits of 
delegating technical questions to an expert agency. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of 
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial 
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven 
Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Law 
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990). 
 222. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999).  Assuming that agencies have validly 
been delegated Congress’s power to authorize or preempt, agency action already satisfies the 
formal requirements of the dormant Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause, 
respectively.  However, to the extent that one wishes to use those clauses to protect the spirit 
(rather than merely the letter) of “our federalism,” agencies have a mandate to consider that 
spirit in making authorization and preemption decisions. Id. But see John F. Manning, 
Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
2003 (2009) (arguing that judicial protection for federalism must be based in text, rather than 
the purposes, of the Constitution). 
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critical projects that are consistent with “sound national energy policy.”223  
Thus, FERC has authority to address both the technical and the federalism 
aspects of the energy-policy-innovation versus market-integration dilemma. 
Finally, alternative modes of addressing this dilemma are unlikely to be 
effective.  For example, while interstate compacts may be very useful for 
addressing regional dilemmas like those presented by interstate 
waterways,224 they would be less helpful in addressing a problem that, like 
climate change, links all states.  To devise a consensual imported electricity 
policy, California would have to coordinate with Arizona, and Arizona 
would have to coordinate with New Mexico, and New Mexico would have 
to coordinate with Colorado.  Furthermore, regulation of imported fossil 
fuels would touch noncontiguous states across the country:  this is why 
Midwestern states filed arguments against California’s low-carbon fuel 
standard.225  The problem requires national—rather than merely regional—
coordination. 
IV.   RECONCILING STATE REGULATION AND A NATIONAL MARKET 
Once FERC is empowered to authorize or preempt state exported energy 
regulations, it should use that authority to strike a balance between national 
energy markets and state experimentation in energy policy.  It should be 
empowered to make rules or, alternatively, issue guidance that signals to 
state lawmakers the boundaries of their authority in each of the three areas 
of exported regulation:  imported electricity, imported fuels, and exported 
fuel and energy supply chains. 
A.   Imported Electricity 
The two primary concerns regarding state regulation of imported 
electricity are explicit discrimination and drastically inconsistent 
evaluations of different power sources.  Explicit discrimination is an easy 
case:  FERC should preempt discriminatory provisions.  The only difficult 
 
 223. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b) (2012) (as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005)); see also R. Seth Davis, Note, Conditional Preemption, 
Commandeering, and the Values of Cooperative Federalism:  An Analysis of Section 216 of 
EPAct, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 440–41 (2008) (arguing that the statute creates an effective 
cooperative federalism regime). But see Stein, supra note 124, at 244 (arguing that FERC’s 
power has been vitiated by the courts).  The EPA, of course, has been given the task of 
implementing numerous systems of cooperative federalism including the Clean Air Act’s 
provisions for best available control technology at new industrial sources, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7475(a) (2012), and for performance standards for existing sources in specified categories. 
Id. § 7411(d). 
 224. Mark S. Davis & Michael Pappas, Escaping the Sporhase Maze:  Protecting State 
Waters Within the Commerce Clause, 73 LA. L. REV. 175, 198–99 (2012) (discussing use of 
compacts to exempt state authority from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny); see also 
Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 754–58 & nn.57–68 
(2010) (documenting fifty environmentally focused compacts concluded with other nations). 
 225. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 512–13 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“The states of Nebraska, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, 
and South Dakota (which are major producers of corn and ethanol) filed an amicus brief in 
support of en banc rehearing.”). 
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question is severability:  Should FERC have the power to preempt portions 
of state energy standards while leaving the rest intact?  For example, if a 
state legislature passed a renewable power standard only because it thought 
that discrimination in favor of in-state power would create “green jobs,”226 
then preempting that portion and authorizing the rest would arguably leave 
the state with a policy that it would never have passed.227  To remedy this 
problem, states should be encouraged to include a severability plan that lays 
out their preferred response to federal preemption.  If states do not offer 
such a plan, FERC should preempt only the discriminatory portion of the 
regulation to minimize disruption to state policy.228 
Implicit discrimination is more complex.  FERC should bracket state 
authority to regulate imported electricity based on its source.  First, FERC 
should only allow states to address how electricity was produced in another 
state if the differential treatment is based on climate impact.  For example, 
states should not have the authority to project their views of nuclear power 
into neighboring states no matter how strongly those views are held.229  
That kind of extraterritorial regulation would be just as problematic as 
limiting trade based on the wage paid to out-of-state workers—only the 
entirely cross-border harm of climate change can justify regulating the out-
of-state supply chain of a commodity like electricity.230  Second, FERC, 
employing a science advisory committee and the best science, should 
establish boundaries on states’ assessments of different power sources, 
rejecting outlier views and establishing a hierarchy of power sources based 
on their climate impact.231  This would ensure that states employ broadly 
consistent standards that would allow integrated markets. 
 
 226. Farrell, supra note 184. 
 227. This is the result that courts try to avoid when severing a partially unconstitutional 
state statute. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 
(2006) (“[W]e must next ask:  Would the legislature have preferred what is left of its statute 
to no statute at all?”). 
 228. This is also the preference of the courts. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 
491, 504 (1985) (“[T]he normal rule [is] that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the 
required course.”). 
 229. In practice this could mean requiring states to count nuclear electricity generated in 
other states toward compliance with the state’s renewable power standard. 
 230. Of course, a nuclear accident could harm residents in a neighboring state just as a 
coal-fired facility across the border could harm neighboring states’ air quality or a wind farm 
could harm migratory birds.  States have a legitimate interest in their neighbor states’ 
environmental policies, but that does not give them authority to regulate with the aim of 
changing those policies.  The contours of state authority over actions in neighboring states 
are set by the interaction of preexisting state and federal laws.  For example, state regulation 
of nuclear power plants based on radiological safety is preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. 
See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 422 (1st Cir. 2013).  State 
common law nuisance actions against industrial facilities in neighboring states are 
preempted by the Clean Water Act. See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 
(1987).  States should not be allowed to leverage their energy policies to punish energy 
sources that they are disabled from regulating. 
 231. This proposal is consistent with that of other scholars who have suggested that 
FERC should use its authority to decarbonize the electricity sector. STEVEN WEISSMAN & 
ROMANY WEBB, ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT LEGISLATION, VOLUME 2:  FERC 
(July 2014), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ccelp/FERC_Report_FINAL.pdf. 
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B.   Imported Fuel 
Regulation of imported fuel raises the same issues and requires similar 
solutions.  FERC should preempt explicit discrimination, and remedy 
implicit discrimination, by placing outer boundaries based on the best 
science available on the climate impact that can be attributed to out-of-state 
fuels.  Thus, the basic structure of California’s low-carbon fuel standard 
should be authorized, but California’s discriminatory treatment of out-of-
state heavy oil should be preempted,232 and it should be required to regulate 
ethanol either nationally or by facility rather than breaking out California 
fuel for specifically favorable treatment.233 
Imported fuel, however, presents two additional problems.  First, some of 
the out-of-state emissions that comprise a fuel’s carbon intensity are the 
emissions required to transport the fuel and its components in interstate 
commerce.234  Attaching a penalty to movement in interstate commerce is 
the archetypal violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, so this portion of 
carbon intensity scores should be preempted.  It is one thing for a state to 
even-handedly regulate production emissions across the country; it is an 
entirely different matter to impose a virtual tax on all transport across the 
country.  States should not be allowed to adopt regulations designed to slow 
interstate commerce. 
Second, worldwide supply chains mean that much of the petroleum 
production regulated by a low-carbon fuel standard is foreign.  Thus, when 
states regulate imported fuels based on how they were produced states are 
regulating emissions in other countries, setting U.S. trade policy, and are 
likely violating international trade law.235  States should not be allowed to 
“embroil the National Government” in trade disputes.236  Instead, FERC 
should preempt state regulation of imported fuels from other countries.237  
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But what about foreign fuels that would be favored by a low-carbon fuel 
standard because they are produced by low-carbon methods abroad?238  
FERC should ensure that these sources are given the opportunity to opt in to 
state standards, which would allow states to encourage imports of foreign 
fuels that they believe to be beneficial to the environment. 
C.   Exported Fuel and Energy Supply Chains 
FERC will necessarily and appropriately have less power to supervise 
state regulation of fossil fuel export and cross-state shipments of energy 
products.239  Fossil fuels and the kinds of machinery used in the energy 
industry generally will have at least some potential impact on the state 
environment.240  As a result, states have authority to control shipments of 
these products to avoid these impacts.  But FERC can nevertheless issue 
guidance to ward off abuses of that legitimate state authority. 
First, FERC should make clear that state environmental assessments may 
not focus on out-of-state environmental impacts unless (1) it is done by 
agreement with the other state or (2) it has adopted safeguards to ensure an 
even-handed consideration of climate impacts in all state decisions.  There 
is every temptation to attach a strict climate test to projects enabling out-of-
state fuel industries while ignoring emissions associated with in-state 
industry.241  This limitation would provide room for a limited consideration 
of the climate impact of state decisions without threatening retaliation and 
Balkanization. 
Second, while affording wide latitude to state regulation of local impacts, 
FERC should preempt state regulations that are obviously aimed at 
disrupting industries in other states.  For example, FERC should carefully 
scrutinize blanket prohibitions on export facilities and oil pipelines.  The 
Energy Policy Act of 2005’s242 treatment of state transmission siting 
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authority may be a good model for FERC’s authority:  respecting the 
principle of cooperative federalism, FERC should preempt state siting 
authority over crude pipelines if, and only if, a permit is being unreasonably 
delayed.243 
CONCLUSION 
U.S. energy policy is at a turning point.  Imminent decisions by 
companies and regulators will determine U.S. energy policy for decades to 
come.  State experiments with innovative energy policies play a crucial role 
in determining what policies will help the country rise to this challenge.  
But the riddle that states are being asked to solve—climate regulation—is a 
global problem that plays out over increasingly integrated national and 
international energy markets.  State energy policy experiments are also 
fertile ground for protectionist measures that would at best forfeit the 
efficiency and reliability benefits of integrated energy markets, and at 
worst, could ignite state-to-state and even international trade wars.  
Congress should preserve the benefits of state experimentation, while 
protecting free trade in energy markets, by authorizing the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission to supervise state regulation of energy production 
in other states. 
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